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DE FACTO PARENT AND
NONPARENT CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS
JEFFREY A. PARNESS* AND MATTHEW TIMKO**
Traditionally, American state laws have recognized that the federal
constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of a child vests in either the
heterosexual birth parents or the adoptive parents of the child. Recently, state
laws have also recognized this parental right of “care, custody, and control” to
opposite sex unmarried couples who bore the child of sex. Even more recently,
state laws have recognized this parental right for those who did not engage in
sexual intercourse leading to a pregnancy and birth. State laws have also
increasingly limited this childcare right of traditionally recognized parents by
allowing nonparents to secure court-ordered childcare over the objections of current
parents, whether by recognizing these nonparents as de facto parents or as third
parties with childcare standing. While state childcare law opportunities have
evolved significantly as family structures, genetic testing, and assisted reproduction
techniques have changed, the laws on parental and nonparental child support have
not changed much. This Article explores actual and potential child support laws
arising from the new childcare laws for both parents and nonparents.
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INTRODUCTION
Under state norms, nonparents seeking childcare orders
increasingly can be declared legal parents on equal footing with
existing parents. Such declarations occur under differing names,
including de facto, presumed, and psychological parentage (herein
collectively referred to as de facto parentage).1 De facto parentage
determinations generally encompass recognition of parental status in
the absence of biological ties or an earlier formal act, like a voluntary
paternity acknowledgement, a birth certificate registration, marriage

1. See, e.g., LP v. LF, 338 P.3d 908, 915 n.9 (Wyo. 2014) (“Although the elements
of in loco parentis, psychological parentage, and de facto parentage are slightly
different, we will occasionally refer to them collectively as de facto parentage.”).
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to the birth mother, or adoption.2 Nonparents with childcare interests
can, however, pursue court-ordered childcare without recognition as
de facto parentage in certain situations.
In cases where nonparents are not recognized as de facto parents,
these nonparents can still secure childcare orders over the objections
of current legal parents.3 Often labeled as third parties, these
nonparents are frequently grandparents or stepparents.4 Childcare
rights for nonparents usually involve fewer parental opportunities than
de facto parent childcare, illustrated by distinctions between visitation
and custody or between allocations of parental responsibilities
involving “decision making”5 and “parenting time.”6
Residential family ties, the types of adult-child relationships, and
childcare agreements often are key in assessing both de facto parent
and nonparent childcare requests. Therefore, any opportunity for
court-ordered childcare for potential de facto parents or for
nonparents over the objection of current legal parents usually depends
on the existence of certain facts such as family ties, adult-child
relationships, and agreements between nonparents and parents.
These prerequisites can act concurrently or independently to prompt
courts to grant childcare requests.
When a childcare order is secured, whether by a de facto parent or
by a nonparent, some financial and nonfinancial child support is

2. See id. at 910, 912, 921 (declining to adopt de facto parentage or parentage by
estoppel to appellant because although he testified to having a sexual relationship with
the mother of the child during the time period that the child could have been
conceived, genetic testing concluded that he was not the child’s biological father).
3. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Constitutional Constraints on Second Parent Laws, 40 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 811, 813 n.9 (2013) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(1) (2012); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(1.5) (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29 (2002)) (noting that
childcare orders may include, among other things, “orders regarding custody,
visitation, and allocation of parental responsibilities”).
4. See Leah M. Hauser, Grandparents as De Facto Parents: Custody or Visitation Rights
to the Child, MILES & STOCKBRIDGE (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.milesstockbridge.com/
family-law-blog/posts/grandparents-de-facto-parents-custody-or-visitation-rights-child
(explaining that a difference between de facto parents and third parties, like
grandparents, is that third parties do not have rights to custody of or visitation to the
child in question, while de facto parents do).
5. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.5(b) (2016) (directing courts to allocate which
parent will make decisions regarding education, health, religion, and extracurricular activities).
6. See id. at 5/602.7 to 602.10 (allocating parent time according to the child’s
“best interests” by considering factors such as the child’s interests, the parent’s
interests, whether either parent has ever been convicted of a crime, and the mental
health of all individuals involved).
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inevitably assumed. Upon reviewing de facto parent and nonparent
childcare laws, we examine the potential (and desired) child support
consequences. In this Article, we chiefly explore what child support might
arise involving financial support directed to current legal parents. Thus,
we look to what financial child support orders might be entered against
those who do or could seek de facto parent or nonparent childcare.
Finally, we explore child support from those ineligible to pursue
childcare orders, but who promised to provide such support.
We begin our exploration of de facto parent and nonparent child
support by reviewing a problematic case where a non-biological
grandparent was found to be a de facto parent responsible for child
support against his wishes.7 We then examine exemplary de facto
parent and nonparent childcare laws, as they necessarily involve at least
some degree of child support. Thereafter, we summarize the
constitutional limits on de facto parent and nonparent child support
orders. Within these limits, we review existing state laws, as well as
suggested model laws and principles, on both de facto parent and
nonparent child support.
We conclude by urging further
examinations of de facto parent and nonparent child support issues,
particularly by the American Law Institute (ALI) via its 2016 draft of its
Restatement of the Law: Children and the Law (“2016 ALI Restatement
draft”),8 and by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) via its recently adopted “2017 Uniform Parentage
Act” (“2017 UPA”)9 and “Nonparental Child Custody and Visitation
Act” (“NPCCVA”).10 These august bodies have done much to educate
and to spur legal reforms on de facto parent and nonparent childcare;
yet, these institutions, and others, have said little about how childcare
reforms should impact child support duties.
We suggest that in examining de facto parent and nonparent child
support issues, the ALI and NCCUSL, as well as American state lawmakers,
recognize that not all de facto parents or nonparents with childcare
standing should be treated comparably. For instance, some de facto
parents and nonparents may have childcare opportunities, but no child
support duties, while other de facto parents and nonparents may have
child support duties though no childcare opportunities. Furthermore,

7.
8.
9.
10.

Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97 (Johnson I) (N.D. 2000).
RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2016).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
NONPARENTAL CHILD CUSTODY & VISITATION ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAW, Draft for Discussion, 2017).
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we suggest that where child support is available from de facto parents
and/or nonparents, especially when it is independent of any childcare,
the assessment standards should differ from the standards utilized in
assessing child support from biological, marital, and adoptive parents.
I.

AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: ANTONYIO AND MADONNA JOHNSON

The case of Johnson v. Johnson,11 resolved by the North Dakota
Supreme Court in 2000, illustrates how de facto parent or nonparent
child support orders can arise and surprise. It further exemplifies the
need for new guidelines on such child support.
Antonyio and Madonna Johnson were married in September 1986.12
No child was born during this marriage.13 In 1988, the Johnsons, then
living in New Jersey, took custody of Jessica in Pennsylvania, then three
months old and the natural granddaughter of Madonna.14 While
Jessica was scheduled to remain with the Johnsons for so long as it
would take Michelle, the birth mother, to get back on her feet, ten
years later Jessica was still living with the Johnsons.15 Until the age of
nine, Jessica believed that Madonna and Antonyio were her biological
parents.16 During that decade, Jessica was raised as the Johnsons’ child,
residing with them as they regularly changed residences due to
Antonyio’s deployments as an Air Force officer.17 The Johnsons
initiated two separate formal adoption proceedings: one in New Jersey
and one in Kentucky (where Jessica’s natural parents lived).18 However,

11. Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d at 97 (N.D. 2000).
12. Id. at 100.
13. Id.
14. See id. Jessica’s biological mother is Michelle Clayton, who was married to
Madonna’s son David Clayton. Id. In 1988, David was incarcerated in Vermont. Id.
Michelle called the Johnsons requesting help and the Johnsons housed Michelle for about
a week at which point Michelle went back to Kentucky, leaving Jessica with the Johnsons.
Id. Madonna obtained a temporary custody order for thirty days, but Michelle never
returned to retake custody of Jessica. Id. Jessica has no biological ties to Antonyio. Id.
15. See id.
16. Brief for Appellant, Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 2000) (No. 990353),
https://www.ndcourts.gov/_court/briefs/990353.atb.htm (contending that Antonyio
did not believe Jessica should have been told “until later in her life” but “Antonyio
testified that he did not see even the—eventual—disclosure of her biological
parentage as being a factor that was going to change [his] relationship with [Jessica]”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
17. Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d at 100.
18. Id.
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neither proceeding was completed due to Antonyio’s redeployment.19
From August 1988 to May 1997, the Johnsons resided in New Jersey,
Kentucky, and Florida, with Antonyio occasionally deployed overseas.20
In 1997 Antonyio was deployed to Korea while Madonna and Jessica
resided in Florida.21 Antonyio requested Madonna file for divorce in
Florida while he was away, but she never did.22 In May 1998, Antonyio
was sent to Grand Forks, North Dakota.23 By then, Antonyio and
Madonna were living in Kentucky.24
Antonyio filed for divorce in North Dakota in July 1998.25 There,
Madonna sought child support for Jessica, who Madonna urged had
been equitably adopted by herself and Antonyio.26 From 1997 until
1998, Antonyio voluntarily sent Madonna $500 for support, which a
North Dakota court ordered to continue from July 1998 until the
beginning of the divorce trial in April 1999, at which point Antonyio
stopped making support payments.27
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded in 2000 that “North
Dakota law clearly recognizes the doctrine of equitable adoption,”28
citing cases which applied the inheritance law principle of “contract to
adopt.”29 It determined that state public policy supported application
19. See id. (clarifying that these deployments were due to Antonyio’s military work
transfers).
20. Id. at 100.
21. Id. at 124.
22. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 5 (describing how Antonyio asked
Madonna to move to Kentucky, and subsequently for her to file for divorce in there
while he was stationed overseas, which she never did).
23. See Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d at 124.
24. Id. at 124–25.
25. Id. at 125.
26. The basis of Madonna’s argument that she and Antonyio equitably adopted
Jessica are laid out in Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d at 100, which lists factors such as Madonna
and Antonyio raising Jessica to believe she was their daughter, the Air Force listing
Jessica as Antonyio’s dependent daughter on his transfer orders, Jessica’s baptism in
Antonyio’s family’s church, Madonna and Antonyio telling Jessica they had adopted
her, and Antonyio signing letters to Jessica with “Love, Dad.”
27. See Johnson v. Johnson (Johnson II), 652 N.W.2d 315, 318 (N.D. 2002) (stating
that the last payment Antonyio made was on March 4, 1999).
28. See Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d at 101 (defining equitable adoption as “an equitable
remedy to enforce a contract right and, therefore, it is not intended to create the legal
relationship of parent and child, with all its attendant consequences, and does not
effect a legal adoption”).
29. Id. at 103 (citing Geiger v. Estate of Connelly, 271 N.W.2d 570, 571 (N.W.
1978); Fish v. Berzel, 101 N.W.2d 548, 556–57 (N.D. 1960); Zimmerman v. Kitzan, 65
N.W.2d 462, 466 (N.D. 1954); Muhlhauser v. Becker, 20 N.W.2d 353, 354 (N.D. 1945)).
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of the doctrine “to impose a child support obligation under certain
circumstances,” and that no North Dakota statutes forbade it.30 The
high court’s opinion did not address any distinction between
Antonyio’s legal parenthood in child support versus childcare.31
Instead, the North Dakota Supreme Court remanded the case for
resolution of factual issues involving the application of the North
Dakota equitable adoption doctrine to determine if Antonyio needed
to provide support.32
On remand, the lower court found that Antonyio and Madonna had
equitably adopted Jessica.33 It set child support from Antonyio at
$669.34 The case returned to the North Dakota Supreme Court on the
issue of the amount of support Antonyio owed from the time the first
trial began in April 1999 until a support order was issued in a second

30. See id. at 109; see also id. at 106 n.3 (explaining that such an application of the
equitable adoption doctrine was “limited” as the court expressed “preference for
adherence to statutory procedures” on formal adoptions).
31. Id. at 101 (clarifying that Antonyio never sought childcare or visitation
opportunities; therefore, the request from Madonna was solely for monetary support
for herself and child support for Jessica, both of which were denied). But see State ex
rel. L.N. v. State, 157 P.3d 352, 354–55 (Utah App. 2007) (holding that grandparents
who became child caretakers, but then abandoned the child, were nevertheless
responsible for child support payments to the state that had taken custody of the child
due to abuse by the person with whom the grandparents had placed the child).
32. See Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d, at 110. But see id. at 112 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting)
(“This is a case of a grandmother and her grandchild who have never lived in North
Dakota . . . . [I]t is clear that if an ‘equitable adoption’ took place, it took place in New
Jersey or Kentucky and would therefore be governed by the law of one of those
states.”). In both New Jersey and Kentucky there was no equitable adoption doctrine.
Here, the dissent deemed New Jersey or Kentucky law appropriate under North
Dakota choice of law rules for contract case, and the majority did not respond. Id. at
123.
Unfortunately, the court in Johnson did not consider utilizing a conflict of laws
interest analysis to determine which state’s child support law might operate, given that
Antonyio was in North Dakota and Jessica was in Kentucky. Also, neither opinion
considered whether to decline jurisdiction altogether, or at least over the parentage
or child support issues.
33. See Johnson II, 652 N.W.2d 315, 316 (N.D. 2002).
34. Brief for Appellant at 7, Johnson II, 652 N.W.2d 315 (No. 20010288),
http://www.ndcourts.gov/_court/briefs/20010288.atb.htm (stating that the trial
court applied the child support calculation standard of North Dakota, but held the
payments to be effective August 2001, after the court ruled that the equitable adoption
occurred; the court also ruled that Antonyio was eligible for interim support of $500
for August and September 2001).
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trial in July 2001.35 In 2002, the North Dakota Supreme Court
recognized that Antonyio had been paying Madonna $500 a month in
“interim spousal support” from May 1997 (before he moved to North
Dakota) until April 1999, which was “intended to be child support.”36
The court held that because the trial court had correctly found
Antonyio equitably adopted Jessica, the original $500 order should
apply retroactively to the time between the start of the first trial in April
1999 and the end of the second trial in July 2001.37 It also ruled the
$669.00 support order should operate after the end of the second trial,
beginning in August 2001.38 The decision rested on the equitable
adoption finding that Antonyio was Jessica’s legal parent before the
divorce case was filed.39 Although Antonyio never sought a childcare
order, he was still liable for child support to Madonna, who had
custody of Jessica, even though both were in Kentucky.40
The equitable adoption doctrine in North Dakota allowed a previous
nonparent like Antonyio to become a parent responsible for child
support. The support obligation could be applied retroactively to
cover any time when there was de facto parentage. In Johnson II,
Antonyio’s de facto parentage was recognized as arising (at least) at
the time he filed for divorce.41
Outside of North Dakota, various parental and nonparental
childcare laws exist with different implications. For example, it may be
that nonparents like Antonyio can be responsible for child support

35. Johnson II shows that Madonna again appealed the retirement income and spousal
support denials, in addition to arguing that child support should begin on January 1, 1999,
in the amount of $669 per month. 652 N.W.2d at 318. In upholding the equitable
adoption, the court also recognized that since 2000, a guardian ad litem appointed for
Jessica, as well as Jessica’s biological parents, “consented to an equitable adoption of
Jessica,” removing any argument that Jessica had four possible parents. Id. at 317–18.
36. See id. at 318–19 (explaining that while Antonyio was ordered to pay child
support to Madonna in the amount of $500 through August 1998, the last payment
was made March 4, 1999, and from the commencement of the first trial in April 1999
until July 2001, Antonyio was not ordered to pay and did not pay anything to Madonna
for child support).
37. Id. at 320.
38. See id. (ruling that Antonyio’s equitable adoption of Jessica applied the interim
child support order to more than two years of back child support from the
commencement of the first trial in April 1999).
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 315 (holding that Madonna was entitled to child support payment for
the months it took for the divorce judgment to be entered, indicating that Antonyio
was Jessica’s de facto parent by the time he filed for divorce).
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even without any designation of legal parentage, or that nonparents
like Antonyio may never be responsible for child support. Statutes on
de facto parent childcare opportunities can encompass child support
duties for newly named parents.42 Statutes on nonparent childcare
could encompass child support duties for nonparent child
caretakers.43 This Article reviews American state parental and
nonparental childcare laws, as they are quite relevant to any child
support duties for de facto parents and nonparents. This review
demonstrates the general lack of written standards on de facto parent
or nonparent child support.
II.

DE FACTO PARENT CHILDCARE LAWS

Grandparents, stepparents, and other current nonparents can
secure childcare orders after being declared de facto legal parents.
Then, under state laws, they are usually deemed to be on comparable
footing as existing childcare parents.44 Such parentage declarations
occur under differing names, including equitable adoption; parentage
by estoppel; and de facto, presumed, or psychological parentage.45 De
42. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-8 (2013) (allocating child support duties to
stepparents, who become responsible as parents once they marry spouses who already
have children).
43. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.371 (West 2016) (listing examples of
nonparent duties such as caring for and protecting the child, disciplining the child,
and providing the child with necessities such as clothing and shelter).
44. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. 13 § 8-203 (2009) (“Unless parental rights are
terminated, a parent-child relationship established under this chapter[, which
includes giving birth, adoption, de facto parenthood, and presumed parenthood,]
applies for all purposes, except as otherwise specifically provided . . . .”); D.C. CODE
§ 16-831.03(c)(1) (2001) (stating that for certain statutory proceedings involving
children, “a parent and a de facto parent” are comparably “governed”); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19-A § 1853(1) (2016) (dictating similar applications to the Delaware Code);
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748
A.2d 539, 554 (N.J. 2000) (“Once a third party has been determined to be a
psychological parent to a child . . . he or she stands in parity with the legal parent.”);
In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 177 (Wash. 2005) (“We thus hold that henceforth
in Washington, a de facto parent stands in legal parity with an otherwise legal parent,
whether biological, adoptive, or otherwise.”).
45. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2016) (presumed parent); DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 13 § 8-201(c) (de facto parent); Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d at 520 (equitable
adoption); Johnson v. Johnson, 286 N.W.2d 886, 887–88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979)
(parentage by estoppel); V.C., 748 A.2d at 551–52 (psychological parentage).
These forms of legal parentage, both statutory and common law, are reviewed
generally in Jeffrey A. Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution: The Key Questions, 59 WAYNE
L. REV. 743, 752–63 (2013) [hereinafter Parentage Law (R)Evolution]. The varying
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facto parentage typically arises under imprecise norms that encompass
recognition of parental status in the absence of an earlier formal act,
like marriage to the birth parent, a voluntary parentage
acknowledgement, a birth certificate registration, a state recognized
adoption, or a court judgment.46 Imprecise norms establishing de
facto parenthood can include same-household residence as the child,
holding out a child as one’s own, and/or the establishment of a
parental-like relationship.47
Several norms and nomenclatures often operate within the de facto
parent laws of a single state. One term can have a different meaning
in different jurisdictions, prompting some interstate confusion.48 For
example, a de facto parent must live “in the same household” with the child
in the District of Columbia,49 but not in Delaware.50 Household residence
can lead to presumed fatherhood for a man (and likely motherhood for a
woman) in Texas rather than to de facto parentage.51 Psychological
parenthood can arise for a woman (and a man) in Washington State.52
In some imprecise parentage cases, women can be fathers.53 Children
approaches in southern states to both de facto parent and nonparent childcare orders
over the current objections of biological or adoptive parents are reviewed in detail in
Ferrand v. Ferrand, 221 So. 3d 909, 918–38 (La. Ct. App. 2016).
46. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Choosing Among Imprecise American State Parentage Laws,
76 LA. L. REV. 481, 493 (2015).
47. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 8-201(c) (describing a de facto parent as
someone who encompasses a “parent-like relationship” with the child).
48. See § 8-204(a)(5) (defining a “presumed” parent as one that, “[f]or the first
[two] years of the child’s life,” resides “in the same household with the child,” while
holding out the child as one’s own); see also § 8-201(c) (deeming a person a “de facto”
parent if, inter alia, a person exercised “parental responsibility” and “acted in a
parental role,” and also if the person “had the support and consent of the child’s
parent or parents”); § 8-204(a)(1) (demonstrating that a “presumed” marital parent
for a child born during the marriage is not an imprecise norm).
49. See D.C. CODE § 16-831.01(1)(A)(i)–(B)(i) (stating that a de facto parent is
someone who lived in the same household of the child at time of the child’s birth or
for at least ten of twelve months preceding custody request).
50. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13 § 8-201(c) (indicating that a de facto parent must
have received “support and consent of the child’s” parent(s), “exercised parental
responsibility,” and “acted in a parental role”).
51. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (2016) (allowing for presumed
fatherhood for a man who continuously lived with the child for the child’s first two
years of life).
52. See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 168 (Wash. 2005) (defining
“psychological parent” as a parent-like relationship based on “day-to-day interaction,
companionship, and shared experiences”).
53. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.106 (stating that paternity presumptions apply
to maternity); § 160.204(a)(5) (allowing for presumption of fatherhood if, inter alia,
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may have three (or more) childcare parents.54 A household residency
norm for de facto parenthood may or may not have a fixed time.55 De facto
parentage may or may not be accompanied by an explicit requirement of
consent by a current legal parent to the developing parental-like
relationship between child and nonparent.56 Some de facto parents, like
unwed fathers with biological ties, could have achieved parentage via
formal acts, like voluntary acknowledgements, but failed to do so.57
De facto parental childcare interests can arise from either statute or
common law. In some states, common law recognitions beyond statutes
are quite limited, typically because of separation of powers concerns.58

the man resides with the child for the child’s first 2 years and holds out as one’s own);
In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 98 A.3d 494, 496 (N.H. 2014) (concluding that a
former same-sex partner sufficiently stated a claim that she was the presumed parent
of a child when she cared for the child on a daily basis, made important decisions for
the child, and sent the child weekly child support checks); Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d
283, 284, 297 (N.M. 2012) (holding that although a former same-sex partner was not
a child’s biological or adoptive mother, she could still establish presumptive paternity
because she financially supported and co-parented the child).
54. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 2016) (leaving room for more than two
persons as parents); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1853(2) (2016) (“[A] court may
determine that a child has more than [two] parents.”); Dawn M. v. Michael M., 47
N.Y.S.3d 898, 903 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (providing an example of “tri-custody” of tenyear-old child born of sex to best friend of husband’s wife); In re Parentage of J.B.R.,
336 P.3d 648, 649–50 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (discussing possible de facto parentage
for a stepfather even though two other legal parents already exist).
55. Compare TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (stating that a presumed parent
is someone who “continuously resided in the household” during the child’s “first two
years” of life), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (lacking a specific residency
requirement for a person to be a de facto parent).
56. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (allowing for “de facto” parentage
with “the support and consent of the child’s parent or parents”), with § 8-204(a)(5)
(stating that a man is a “presumed” father when, “[f]or the first [two] years of the
child’s life, he resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the
child as his own”). At times, implicit consents are differently prompted. Compare MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 6(a)(4) (West 2016) (explaining that a man is presumed
the father if he and the mother jointly receive “the child into their home”), with TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (indicating that a presumed father would reside in
the same household with the child).
57. See, e.g., Jason P. v. Danielle S., 215 Cal. Rptr. 3d 542, 546, 563 (Ct. App. 2017)
(explaining that a sperm donor who assisted in reproduction may be a presumed
parent by receiving the child into his home and holding out the child as his own).
58. The balance of lawmaking between legislatures and courts is explored in Jeffrey
A. Parness, State Lawmaking on Federal Constitutional Childcare Parents: More Principled
Allocations of Powers and More Rational Distinctions, 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 479 (2017).
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NONPARENT CHILDCARE LAWS

Nonparents who do not secure, or are ineligible to secure, de facto
parent status may be eligible to secure childcare orders over the
current objections of existing parents. Nonparent childcare standing
can arise under general laws or special laws applicable to only some,
like grandparents or stepparents.
Sometimes, nonparents eligible to seek childcare orders are described
as having undertaken parental or parental-like duties, though these acts
do not prompt de facto parentage.59 The eligibility requirements in
general and special nonparent childcare laws vary, meaning a person
(like a grandparent) who is not eligible under a special law may still be
able to utilize a general law to secure a childcare opportunity.
A.

General Laws

General nonparent childcare laws dictate when nonparents may
have custody or visitation rights regarding a child. As to broader
nonparent childcare laws, consider a South Dakota statute that allows
“any person other than the parent of a child to intervene or petition a
court . . . for custody or visitation of any child with whom he or she has
served as a primary caretaker, has closely bonded as a parental figure,
or has otherwise formed a significant and substantial relationship.”60
Further, under a South Dakota statute, a “[p]arent’s presumptive right
to custody” can also be diminished by a third-party childcare order
when there is abandonment or persistent parental neglect, forfeiture
or surrender of parental rights to a nonparent, abdication of “parental
rights and responsibilities,” or “extraordinary circumstances” where
there would be “serious detriment to the child.”61 In Kentucky, a “de
facto custodian” of a child can seek childcare if he or she was “the

59. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (explaining that
a “parent-like relationship” is needed for a nonparent, providing the example of a
biological mother’s former partner having standing to seek visitation without an
available custody opportunity).
60. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29 (2013). Thus, not all de facto parents can qualify
as de facto custodians with standing to seek childcare orders. See, e.g., Truman v.
Lillard, 404 S.W.3d 863, 865 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (describing the situation of a former
same-sex partner of a woman who adopted her niece not being a de facto custodian
and failing to show a waiver of superior parental right to custody).
61. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29(1)–(4). The statute was applied to permit
visitation favoring a man with no biological or adoptive ties. See Clough v. Nez,
759 N.W.2d 297, 303–04 (S.D. 2008); see also § 25-5-33 (allowing courts to order a
parent to pay child support to nonparent having “custodial rights”).
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primary caregiver” and “financial supporter,” resided with the child for
at least six months, and the child is under the age of three.62 In
Colorado, nonparent childcare involving an allocation of parental-like
responsibilities can arise when the nonparent “has had the physical
care of a child for a period of [182] days or more.”63 In New Mexico,
“[w]hen neither parent is able . . . to provide appropriate care,” a child
may be “raised by . . . kinship caregivers,” including an adult with a
significant bond to the child who cares for the child “consistent with the
duties and responsibilities of a parent.”64 Finally, in Wisconsin, a “person
who has maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship
with the child” may secure “reasonable visitation rights . . . if the court
determines that visitation is in the best interests of the child.”65
Beyond statutes, case precedents on nonparent childcare also differ
interstate. For instance, in Ohio, there can be no “shared parenting”
contracts between parents and nonparents.66 However, “a parent may
voluntarily share with a nonparent the care, custody, and control of his
or her child through a valid shared-custody agreement,” which may

62. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1)(a) (2006) (declaring that residence for at
least one year is required if the child is older than three). Thus, not all de facto parents
can qualify as de facto custodians with standing to seek childcare. See, e.g., Truman,
404 S.W.3d at 863 (concluding that a former same-sex partner of woman who adopted
her niece was not a de facto custodian and failed to show a waiver of superior parental
right to custody); Spreacker v. Vaughn, 397 S.W.3d 419, 422–23 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012)
(deciding that a paternal great aunt is de facto custodian). There are similar laws in
Indiana and Minnesota. See MINN. STAT. § 257c.03(2) (2016) (defining “de facto
custodian”); K.S. v. B.W., 954 N.E.2d 1050, 1051 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing IND. CODE.
§ 31-9-2-35.5 (2007)). The phrase “de facto custodian,” and similar phrases, can also
be used in other settings. See, e.g., Colusa Cty. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v.
R.J. (In re Jesse C.), No. C069325, 2012 WL 5902301, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2012)
(describing a de facto parent as one who cares for child during a dependency
proceeding, but that de facto parent status is lost when dependency is terminated).
63. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(1)(c) (2017); see, e.g., Olds v. Berry (In re Child
B.B.O.), 277 P.3d 818, 824 (Colo. 2012) (holding that half-sister has standing); In re
Parental Responsibilities of D.T., 292 P.3d 1120, 1121 (Colo. App. 2012) (holding that
a mother’s friend did not gain standing as she “served more of a grandmotherly role,
rather than a parental role” and as mother never ceded her parental rights).
64. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-10B-2, 3(A) (2016); see Stanley J. v. Cliff L., 319 P.3d 662,
668 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (acknowledging that sporadic stays with mother’s friends
prior to her death and children’s “nomination” of friends as guardians sufficient to
demonstrate a “bond”).
65. WIS. STAT. § 767.43(1) (2016); see Vanderheiden v. Vanderheiden, No.
2011AP2672, 2013 WL 5311475, at *9 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2013) (citing
§ 767.43(1)) (awarding former stepfather visitation of child).
66. See In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241, 249 (Ohio 2002).
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create, for a nonparent, “an agreement for permanent shared legal
custody of the parent’s child” or an agreement for temporary shared
legal custody, as when the agreement is revocable by the parent.67 In
Minnesota, under certain conditions there is a common law right to
child visitation over parental objection for a former family member,
like an aunt who stood in loco parentis with the child.68
While jurisdictions vary in application, many states recognize at least
limited custodial or contact rights without requiring a biological
connection between a child and caregiver. On occasion, general de
facto parent and nonparent childcare interests are recognized in a
single statute. For example, in Oregon “any person, including but not
limited to a related or nonrelated foster parent, stepparent,
grandparent[,] or relative by blood or marriage, who has established
emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship or an ongoing
personal relationship with a child may petition” for an order involving
“custody, placement[,] or guardianship of that child.”69 Where there
is a “child-parent relationship,” the petitioner may be granted
“custody, guardianship, right of visitation[,] or other right,” seemingly
as a de facto parent.70 Where there is “an ongoing personal
relationship,” the petitioner may be granted “visitation or contact
rights,” seemingly as a nonparent.71

67. In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 305–06 (Ohio 2011). Custody in the nonparent is
only allowed under an agreement when the juvenile court deems the nonparent suitable
and the shared custody is in the best interests of the child. See In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d at
244, 249; see also In re LaPiana, Nos. 93691, 93692, 2010 WL 3042394, at *10 (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 5, 2010) (securing visitation for a former lesbian partner with two children
born of assisted reproduction, where there was a written agreement to raise jointly the
first child and other evidence of intent to share custody of both children).
68. See Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 593 (Minn. 2012) (“[U]nder the
common law in Minnesota, a finding of in loco parentis status has been essential to
the granting of visitation to non-parents over the objection of a fit parent.”); see also In
re V.D.W., 152 So. 3d 336, 341–42 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Waites v. Ritchie
(In re Waites), 152 So. 3d 306 (Miss. 2014) (describing a post-divorce situation where
the mother’s ex-husband stood in loco parentis to her child, who had been conceived
before the marriage but born during the marriage). At times, attaining “in loco
parentis” status seemingly elevates nonparent to parental status. See, e.g., Daniel v.
Spivey, 386 S.W.3d 424, 429 (Ark. 2012) (describing precedent that granted in loco
parentis status to stepparents and same sex partners of parents).
69. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119(1) (West 2016).
70. § 109.119(3)(a).
71. § 109.119(3)(b).
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Special Grandparent Laws

Special nonparent childcare laws72 sometimes operate only for
grandparents.73 For instance, a grandparent in New York has standing
to seek visitation with a grandchild over parental objection when
“conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene.”74 In Alaska,
visitation can be sought by a grandparent who “has established or
attempted to establish ongoing personal contact” with the
grandchild.75 In Georgia, a grandparent can obtain visitation “if the
court finds the health or welfare of the child would be harmed unless
visitation is granted” and the child’s best interests would be served.76
In North Dakota, per statute: “The grandparents . . . of an unmarried
minor child may be granted reasonable visitation rights to the
child . . . upon a finding that visitation would be in the best interests of
the child and would not interfere with the parent-child relationship.”77
Unlike the Georgia statute, some grandparent childcare statutes are
more restrictive. In Arkansas, a grandparent has standing to seek
visitation if the “marital relationship between the parents . . . has been
severed by death, divorce, or legal separation.”78 In Alabama, under
certain conditions a grandparent can obtain reasonable visitation
rights with a grandchild when the marriage of the child’s parents is
72. Beside special childcare laws, there can also be other special laws addressing
nonparents’ rights and responsibilities to a child. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-8
(2013) (“A stepparent shall maintain his spouse’s children born prior to their marriage
and is responsible as a parent for their support and education suitable to his
circumstances, but such responsibility shall not absolve the natural or adoptive parents
of the children from any obligation of support.”).
73. Grandparent childcare laws are reviewed in Jeffrey A. Parness & Alex Yorko,
Nonparental Childcare and Child Contact Orders for Grandparents, 120 W. VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017).
74. Van Norstrand v. Van Norstrand, 925 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)
(quoting N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72[1] (McKinney 2010)); see also In re Victoria C., 56
A.3d 338, 349 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (finding sibling visitations can be ordered
over parental objections only when standards for grandparent visits have been met),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 88 A.3d 749 (2014).
75. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.065(a)(1) (2016).
76. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(c)(1) (2015) (stating harm may be found where the
minor child resided with the grandparent for over six months or where there was “an
established pattern of regular visitation or child care by the grandparent with the child”).
77. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1(1) (2009). Section 14-09-05.1 was deemed
constitutional in Kulbacki v. Michael, 845 N.W.2d 625, 627 (N.D. 2014) (deciding the
trial court must give parents a favorable presumption and place the burden of proof
on grandparents or great-grandparents), and applied in Bjerke v. Bjerke (In re S.B), 845
N.W.2d 317, 318 (N.D. 2014).
78. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103(b)(1) (2015).
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dissolving or has been dissolved,79 or the child was born out of
wedlock.80 When a child has been adopted, “natural grandparents” in
Alabama may only seek post-adoption grandchild visitation when there
was an intra-family adoption.81 In Wyoming, a grandparent can seek
“reasonable visitation,” but not where a “minor grandchild has been
adopted and neither adopting parent is related by blood to the
child.”82 And in Missouri, grandparents may seek “reasonable”
visitation under certain circumstances, as when the grandchild’s
parents have filed for divorce, but have no standing even when
“unreasonably denied visitation” where the “natural parents are legally
married . . . and are living together with the child.”83
C.

Special Stepparent Laws

Special nonparent childcare laws also sometimes operate for
stepparents. Here, a stepparent’s affirmative steps toward forming a
parent-child relationship is often key. In a Tennessee divorce, “a
stepparent to a minor child born to the other party . . . may be granted
reasonable visitation rights . . . upon a finding that such visitation
rights would be in the best interests of the minor child and that such
stepparent is actually providing or contributing towards the support of
such child.”84 In California, “reasonable visitation to a stepparent” is
permitted if in “the best interest of the minor child.”85 In Oregon,
during a dissolution proceeding a stepparent can obtain custody or
visitation by proving “a child-parent relationship exists,” the presumption
that the parent acts in the child’s best interest has been “rebutted by a
preponderance of the evidence,” and the child’s “best interest” will be

79. ALA. CODE § 30-3-4.2(b)(1) (2016).
80. § 30-3-4.2(b)(2)–(3) (noting that paternity must have been “legally
established” for a paternal grandparent).
81. § 26-10A-30 (stating that such adoption may be by “stepparent, a grandfather,
a grandmother, a brother, a half-brother, a sister, a half-sister, an aunt or an uncle and
their respective spouses”).
82. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101(a), (c) (2017).
83. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.402.1(1), (4) (2016); see also In re Adoption of E.N.C.,
458 S.W.3d 387, 398 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (finding grandparents have no visitation
standing beyond what is allowed by statute).
84. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-303(a) (2017). The Tennessee statute is seemingly of
questionable facial validity under Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), as there are no
required showings as to, e.g., parental unfitness or acquiescence, or child detriment.
85. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3101(a) (West 2004).
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served.86 If a stepparent only proves “an ongoing personal relationship”
with the child, the parental presumption in Oregon must be rebutted by
“clear and convincing evidence.”87 In Virginia, a former stepparent with
a “legitimate interest”88 can secure custody of or visitation with a child
“upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the best
interest of the child would be served thereby.”89 And in New York, a
court has recognized that a stepparent can pursue stepchild visitation
where the biological parent earlier urged successfully that the
stepparent was “chargeable with the subject child’s support.”90
Stepparents are sometimes provided childcare opportunities only
when one (or more) of the legal parents is no longer available as a
parent. In Utah, a former stepparent91 can pursue child custody or
visitation in a divorce or “other proceeding”92 through showing by
“clear and convincing evidence” that, inter alia, the stepparent
“intentionally assumed the role and obligations of a parent, . . . formed
an emotional bond and created a parent-child type relationship,” and
86. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119(3)(a) (West 2017). “Child-parent relationship”
means a relationship within the past six months that “fulfilled the child’s psychological
needs for a parent as well as the child’s physical needs.” § 109.119(10)(a).
87. § 109.119(3)(b). An “‘[o]ngoing personal relationship’ means a relationship
with substantial continuity for at least one year, through interaction, companionship,
interplay and mutuality.” § 109.119(10)(e).
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (2016) (mandating that a person with a legitimate
interest is to be “broadly construed” and may include “former stepparents”).
89. § 20-124.2.B; see, e.g., Brown v. Burch, 519 S.E.2d 403, 412 (Va. Ct. App. 1999)
(finding over the mother’s objection, “clear and convincing evidence of special and
unique circumstances” that justify the joint custody order favoring the father and
former stepfather, with the latter “retaining physical custody of the boy”). Beside
special statutes, there are some common law rights regarding childcare for some
former stepparents. See, e.g., Bethany v. Jones, 378 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Ark. 2011)
(granting former lesbian partner visitation rights after relying on Robinson v. FordRobinson, 208 S.W.3d 140, 144 (Ark. 2005), where a stepmother was able to seek
visitation with her stepson over the father’s objection as long as visitation was in the
child’s “best interest”). Special stepparent childcare laws, of course, may be coupled
with special stepparent adoption laws. See, e.g., LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1252(A)
(2012) (stating that there is no need for even limited home studies in some stepparent
adoptions); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-4-302(1)(a) (2015) (granting standing for
potential adoption rights if stepparent has lived with child and a parent with legal and
physical custody for past sixty days).
90. Paese v. Paese, 41 N.Y.S.3d 245, 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (finding that a
mother was “judicially estopped” from arguing that a stepfather was “not a parent for
the purpose of visitation”).
91. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-102(2)(e) (LexisNexis 2013) (defining “[p]erson
other than a parent” to include “current or former step-parents”).
92. § 30-5a-103(4).
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contributed to the “child’s wellbeing,” where the parent is “absent” or
has “abused or neglected the child.”93 In Delaware, “upon the death
or disability of the custodial or primary placement parent,” a
stepparent who resided with the deceased or disabled parent can
request custody even if “there is a surviving natural parent.”94 And, in
Vermont, under case law,
if a stepparent stands in loco parentis to a child of the marital
household, custody of that child may be awarded to the stepparent
if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the natural
parent is unfit or that extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant
such a custodial order, and that it is in the best interests of the child
for custody to be awarded to the stepparent.95

D.

Other Special Laws

Special nonparent childcare laws can extend beyond eligible
grandparents and stepparents. For example, in Florida an “extended
family member” may bring an action for temporary custody of a minor
child; these members include a “relative of a minor child within the
third degree by blood or marriage to the parent” or “the stepparent of
a minor child if the stepparent is currently married to the parent.”96
In both Arkansas and North Dakota, great-grandparents are included
with grandparents in third-party visitation laws.97 In Illinois, the
third-party visitation law includes “grandparents, great-grandparents,
stepparents, and siblings.”98
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS AGAINST
DE FACTO PARENTS AND NONPARENTS

State laws recognizing financial child support responsibilities for
existing, newly-designated, or even eligible de facto parents, as well as
for nonparents, are limited by the constitutional rights of established
legal parents and the prospective child supporters. There are due
process limits on child support as there are limits on childcare for de
93. § 30-5a-103(2).
94. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 733 (2009).
95. LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 100 A.3d 345, 352 (Vt. 2014) (quoting Paquette v.
Paquette, 499 A.2d 23, 30 (Vt. 1985)).
96. FLA. STAT. § 751.011 (2017); see Mohorn v. Thomas, 30 So. 3d 710, 711 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (employing § 751.01–.011 to recognize temporary custody of a
child in a paternal grandmother).
97. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103(b) (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1.1 (2009).
98. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.9(c) (2016).
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facto parents and nonparents given the superior parental childcare
rights of established parents.
A.

Limits on De Facto Parent Child Support when Accompanied
by Childcare

The constitutional rights of established legal parents chiefly come
into play when child support responsibilities for a de facto parent or a
nonparent are accompanied by opportunities for childcare orders over
the objections of the established parents.
Child support
unaccompanied by childcare orders typically prompt far fewer
objections by existing parents since their superior rights regarding the
care, custody, and control of their children are not impeded.99
It is rare for a de facto parent to object to providing child support
while exercising court-ordered childcare responsibilities. Childcare
and child support are implicitly (and often explicitly) connected
obligations. Any objections by de facto parents are more likely when
child support is ordered to be paid to other child caretakers, like the
legal parents who are biological or adoptive parents.
When confronted by established legal parents challenging a de facto
parent’s constitutional childcare rights,100 courts often summarily

99. Existing legal parents would have little reason to object if the ability to exhibit
care, custody, and control of their children is not at stake under Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 66 (2000). See infra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing the outcome
of the childcare interests challenge in Troxel); infra note 149 and accompanying text
(discussing the superior parental rights of existing legal parents).
100. Of course there can also be state constitutional challenges to attempted de facto
parent childcare, often founded on independent state constitutional interpretations of
state constitutional provisions employing the same, or similar, language found within the
federal constitution, or on unique state constitutional provisions (i.e., having no federal
constitutional counterpart). Compare Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 192 (Iowa
1999) (en banc) (finding “a putative father of a child born [of sexual intercourse] into
a marriage may have a right to standing to challenge paternity under the Due Process
Clause of the Iowa Constitution,” but finding no standing where right is waived, as
when “the challenge is not a serious and timely expression of a meaningful desire to
establish parenting responsibility”), and In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 198 (Tex. 1994)
(relying on Texas constitutional “due course of law” to find unconstitutional laws
restricting a biological father’s ability to challenge a presumed father’s custody), with
Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1053 (Pa. 1999) (concluding that no Pennsylvania due
process rights are applicable for unwed biological fathers as they cannot challenge
paternity presumption in husbands whose marriages are intact). But see K.E.M. v. P.C.S.,
38 A.3d 798, 810 (Pa. 2012) (holding that a biological father sued for child support
for child born to married woman cannot defend based on husband’s paternity by
estoppel unless it serves the child’s best interests).
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dismiss,101 providing little guidance on when such de facto parental
rights infringe upon the superior parental rights of existing parents.
In one case, there could be no third childcare parent when a child
already has two legal parents whose childcare interests have not been
lost.102 Yet elsewhere, state lawmakers increasingly are open to three
(or more) childcare parents, though in limited settings.103
There is also precedent that superior parental rights are more easily
overcome when a private agreement exists which provides for shared
parental control,104 as opposed to private agreements relinquishing
parental rights altogether.105 In some states, there is precedent stating
that when two women agree to jointly raise the child that one will bear
using the ovum of the other, an express waiver of parental rights signed
by the ovum donor on a preprinted form at a reproductive clinic will
101. See, e.g., Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 930–32 (Del. 2011) (en banc)
(recognizing that “de facto” parent designations differ from nonparty standing
without examining closely the “de facto” parent guidelines).
102. See, e.g., Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 749–50 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010)
(declaring a violation of federal due process rights of two fit parents if other persons
are also designated under law as parents). Often, the constitutional question remains
unanswered (and unraised) because courts focus on state public policy favoring only
two parents for any one child. When three parents are initially recognized under law,
as with a birth mother, a husband presumed to be a father, and a third person
presumed to be a parent because he or she held out a child as his or her own, statutes
dictate that courts choose between the two presumed parents. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7612(b) (West 2017) (mandating that competing presumptions of natural
fatherhood should be resolved “on the facts . . . founded on the weightier
considerations of policy and logic”); see also L.A. Cty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs.
v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 11 (Cal. 2004) (employing § 7612(b)); GDK
v. State, 92 P.3d 834, 836–37 (Wyo. 2004) (considering two conflicting paternity
presumptions, with choice between fathers based on “best interests” of child). But see
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (determining that more than two parents will be recognized
if there is otherwise detriment to the child); ME. STAT. tit. 19A, § 1853(2) (2016) (“[A]
court may determine that a child has more than [two] parents.”).
103. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (stating that courts may find detriment to the child
of only two parents by analyzing the “child’s psychological needs”); ME. STAT. tit. 19A, § 1853(2).
104. See, e.g., Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 557 (Kan. 2013). In Frazier, the
court found that a mother who entered into a co-parenting agreement had exercised
her due process rights at the time of the agreement, and because of the constitutional right
to decide the care, custody, and control of her children, she had waived her parental
preference upon signing. Id. Courts should not be required to grant the mother more
rights than she herself had claimed when agreeing to a co-parenting contract. Id.
105. Several states have requirements assuring voluntary and informed consent by
a parent regarding placement of a child for formal adoption. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 50/10 (2016) (requiring form of consent to substantially comply with varying
requirement promoting informed decision making); IND. CODE § 31-19-9-2 (2017)
(requiring consent in court or before a notary public).
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not always bar the ovum donor from seeking de facto parentage.106
Here, unlike most second parent settings, there are biological ties
between the alleged de facto parent and the child.
Some American state statutes go further by upholding joint
parenting agreements between opposite sex,107 same sex female,108 or
same sex male couples109 where only one partner has biological ties,
whether by bearing a child110 or by donating genetic material
prompting birth (as through a gestational111 or a genetic112 surrogate).
Further, some courts have recognized that in assisted reproduction
settings, not all sperm donors have comparable childcare interests.113
Some sperm donors can seize parental childcare rights, like when
there was a preimplantation co-parent agreement. In this situation,
the sperm donor’s parental rights are established even though these
rights necessarily diminish a birth mother’s unilateral superior
parental rights.114 In these cases, typically sperm donors must promptly
and affirmatively seize their paternity opportunity interests, often
106. See, e.g., T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (reviewing
other cases and deciding that the appellant donor did not waive her parental rights).
107. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.11(1)–(2) (2017) (stating a presumption of parentage
for husband and wife who consent to assisted reproduction birth outside of surrogacy);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.7031 (West 2014) (providing a presumption of parentage
for sperm donor in the case of an unwed opposite sex couple).
108. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (describing conception involving consent of “another
intended parent”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-703, 704 (2017) (stating that a person who
provides eggs or consents to assisted reproduction with intent to parent is a parent).
109. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:7 (Supp. 2016) (identifying “intended parent
or parents” in gestational carrier agreements, which may include same sex male couples);
Peter Nicolas, Straddling the Columbia: A Constitutional Law Professor’s Musings on
Circumventing Washington State’s Criminal Prohibition on Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 1235, 1235–36 (2014) (describing some states’ hostility to gay parent adoption).
110. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.11(2) (describing presumption of parentage when
wife and husband consent to assisted reproduction birth to wife with use of “donated
eggs or preembryos”).
111. See, e.g., § 742.13(2), (6) (requiring that either or both intended mother, or
father, must donate genetic material); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:7.
112. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.210 (2) (2017) (defining “surrogate gestation”).
113. See, e.g., Steven S. v. Deborah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(rejecting trial court’s finding of “natural” fatherhood for donor of artificial
insemination, even though donor had had consensual sex with mother).
114. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:2(III), (V)(d) (stating that a “child
conceived through assisted reproduction” can have as a parent one who receives the
child into the person’s home and holds out the child as the person’s own);
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 702–704 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (proposing that while
sperm donor is not necessarily a parent, he can be a parent where there is “the intent
to be the parent” via “record” consent).
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where the birth mothers are not married to others.115 In contrast, for
future pregnancies, births, and parentage, the intent of sperm donors
at the time of sex for children born of consensual sex (e.g., not rape)
is usually irrelevant to assessments of legal paternity for childcare and
child support purposes.116
So, the contours of constitutional constraints on de facto parent
childcare over an established parent’s objections are difficult to define.
Whatever those contours, there is little in current precedents
indicating that existing childcare parents have constitutional claims
undermining possible de facto parent child support orders upon entry
of de facto parent childcare orders.
There are some additional constitutional law principles that help
assess the constitutional interests of de facto childcare parents in
avoiding child support to be paid to biological and/or formal adoptive
parents. First, not all federal constitutional rights have the same or
similar standards on waiver or loss of rights. Consider the explicit
federal constitutional jury trial rights in criminal117 and civil118 cases.
In criminal cases, district judges personally “must address” any
defendants wishing to plead guilty or nolo contendere about “the right
to a jury trial” to ensure an understanding of the right and a voluntary
plea.119 In civil cases, assuming there was no prelawsuit waiver of the
jury trial right,120 parties must “demand a jury trial” by “serving the
115. See, e.g., Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1056 (Pa. 1999) (finding no
Pennsylvania due process rights for unwed biological fathers of children born of sex
to women married to others where the marriages are intact). But see Callender v. Skiles,
591 N.W.2d 182, 192 (Iowa 1999) (en banc) (finding a state constitutional childcare
interest for an unwed biological father though the birth mother is married to another).
116. Thus, beliefs by copulating men as to the impossibility of pregnancy (e.g.,
beliefs as to vasectomies or female birth control) usually do not eliminate their
paternity opportunity interests under Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), or their
child support obligations under state law, even where there were maternal deceptions
about birth control, as in Hughes v. Hutt, 455 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1983), and Faske v. Bonanno,
357 N.W.2d 860 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (per curiam).
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (applicable in state courts).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (not applicable in state courts).
119. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(C), (b)(2). These rules are seemingly mandated
by constitutional precedents, as shown in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1970), which explains that a guilty plea must be a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waiver of the Fifth Amendment constitutional right against self-incrimination and
requiring that a court treat a guilty plea with care and discernment after confirming
the defendant is aware of the consequences.
120. Unlike criminal jury trial rights, which seemingly are never waivable prelawsuit,
even predispute waivers of civil jury trial rights are often sustained. See, e.g., Integrated
Glob. Concepts, Inc. v. j2 Glob., Inc., No. C-12-03434-RMW, 2013 WL 5692352, at *1–
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other parties with a written demand” and “filing the demand” with the
district court,121 actions usually taken by nonparty lawyers.122 While
courts often overlook excusable errors or omissions by lawyers who do
not properly demand the civil jury trial rights of their clients,123 client
waivers of jury trials are sometimes upheld if based on lawyer failures
that are inexcusable124 or that unduly prejudice a party opposing a late
jury trial demand.125 If, in fact, as with the jury trial, context is
2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2013) (“Nearly all states, except Georgia and California, allow
contractual waiver of jury trials.”). There is a dispute on whether state law determines
the validity of a predispute civil jury trial waiver in a federal diversity action, where
clearly the federal jury trial processes are employed when properly demanded. See
AMEC Env’t & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Spectrum Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 13-cv-04059WHO, 2013 WL 6405811, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
121. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b)(1), (2).
122. Comparably, state civil jury trial rights are waived by nonparty lawyers via acts
involving either in court conduct or court filings. See, e.g., Ladd v. Watkins & Vinson,
168 S.W. 138, 139 (Ark. 1914) (finding defendant waived a trial by jury even though
lawyer was absent from courtroom when judicial inquiry on jury trial demands);
Greene v. City of Chi., 382 N.E.2d 1205, 1207–09 (Ill. 1978) (finding a waiver of jury
trial, though no party was inconvenienced or prejudiced by late jury trial demand,
unless “good cause be shown for failure to comply with the statue” on allowing
additional time for doing any act); Johnson v. Sabben, 282 N.E.2d 476, 479 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1972) (affirming trial court’s decision to deny plaintiff’s late jury demand when
counsel intentionally did not ask for jury after client demanded one).
123. See, e.g., Hargreaves v. Roxy Theatre, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 537, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1940)
(asserting that, since the adverse party did not suffer prejudice, “the court should not
be too prone to deprive a litigant of a trial by jury because of an error or omission on
the part of the agent of her attorney to whom she has entrusted her case; where the
act or omission is excusable”); see also Cataldo v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,
39 F.R.D. 305, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (citing Hargreaves, 1 F.R.D. 537) (finding
inadvertence alone, however, will not excuse a party from a jury trial waiver)).
124. See, e.g., Daniel Int’l. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 916 F.2d 1061, 1064
(5th Cir. 1990) (describing factors on utilizing discretion to try case by jury where jury
demand was untimely include whether there will be a disruption in the court’s and
adverse party’s schedule, prejudice to adverse party, the length of delay in filing the
demand, and any reason for tardiness); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 996
(2d Cir. 1973) (determining that untimely jury trial demand may only be overlooked
with a showing of “cause beyond mere inadvertence”); Todd v. Lutz, 64 F.R.D. 150,
152 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (finding no excuses due to negligence, inadvertence, or lack of
intent to waive).
125. See, e.g., Baker v. Amtrak Corp., 163 F.R.D. 219, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (excusing
late jury demand because, inter alia, personal injury cases are usually tried by a jury
and there was a lack of prejudice to the adverse party). Compare Lum v. Discovery
Capital Mgmt., L.L.C., 625 F. Supp. 2d 82, 84 (D. Conn. 2009) (finding no undue
prejudice), with Hirschinger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 884 F. Supp. 317, 320 (S.D. Ind. 1994)
(deciding there was no “strong and compelling” reason to deny untimely jury request
offered without explanation or justification), and Synovus Trust Co., N.A. v. Honda
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important in assessing parental childcare rights, and if there can be
parental rights waivers, de facto parent laws may operate differently
when a de facto parent is recognized due to household residence, a
contract, or the establishment of a parental-like relationship.
Similarly, context can be important when assessing the limits on
child support for de facto childcare parents. Consider that a speaker
who defames a public figure can only be liable for defamation, per First
Amendment precedents, if the speaker acted with “actual malice.”126
But, a speaker who defames a private figure can be liable for
defamation without acting maliciously.127 More relatedly, state laws
now draw distinctions in child support duties between a sperm donor
via consensual sex and a sperm donor via assisted reproduction.128
Likewise, distinctions in child support duties can be made between
possible de facto parent child caretakers who resided with the child
only temporarily and potential de facto parents who developed
parental-like relationships with the child, including identifying
themselves as parents in their communities.
Unsurprisingly, constitutional rights sometimes can operate
differently for men and women. Absent waiver, the federal due process
constitutional interests of parents in the “care, custody, and control of
their children” born as a result of consensual sex129 are automatically
recognized at birth for all women, but not for all men who engage in
the related sex. Certain men, typically biological fathers who
impregnate unwed women, may also need to form a “significant
custodial, personal, or financial relationship” with the child to attain

Motor Co., 223 F.R.D. 699, 701 (M.D. Ga. 2004) (determining any prejudice to
opposing party could be minimized).
126. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (defining “actual
malice” as a statement made with “knowledge that [the statement] was false or [made]
with reckless disregard of whether [the statement] was false or not”).
127. See, e.g., Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 61 (Tex. 2013) (finding plaintiff did
not need to prove actual malice to uphold a libel suit brought against media
defendants in connection with a negatively investigative television broadcast).
128. Arguably, even sperm donors via “consensual” sex differ, as when there is or is not
a certain form of statutory rape (e.g., an adult and a minor “willingly” engage in sex
prompting birth). Rapists are less likely secure childcare interests than non-rapists.
Incidentally, there also appear to be differences in childrearing opportunities for male
and female rapists. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Abortions of the Parental Prerogatives of
Unwed Natural Fathers: Deterring Lost Paternity, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 345, 360–67 (2000)
(identifying differences between criminally prohibited and consensual sexual intercourse).
129. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (plurality opinion).
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federal constitutional childcare protection.130 So women and men
prompting births from sex differ in their childcare opportunities, as
do criminal and civil case litigants with jury trial rights. For de facto
parent child-caretakers, there is usually no sound reason to
differentiate child support duties based on the sex of the parents.
B.

Limits on Nonparent Child Support when Accompanied by Childcare

Unlike de facto childcare parentage, there is a major U.S. Supreme
Court precedent limiting nonparental childcare orders over the
objections of established legal parents. In Troxel v. Granville,131 a 2000
U.S. Supreme Court decision, four justices determined in a plurality
opinion that the liberty interest of parents “in the care, custody, and
control of their children” (herein childcare interests) generally
forecloses states from compelling requested grandparent childcare
over current parental objections.132 Yet, the same four justices
recognized that “special factors,” might justify judicial interference as
long as the contrary contemporary wishes of parents were accorded “at

130. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262–63 (1983). Certain unwed fathers with
such relationships can currently be foreclosed, however, if the mothers were married
to other men in states with a conclusive (i.e., irrebuttable) presumption of paternity
for husbands. Justice Scalia found states were free to give categorical preference to
mothers’ husbands in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (plurality
opinion). But Justice Stevens in Michael H. “would not foreclose” the possibility of
childcare interests for such unwed fathers. Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring). Four
other Justices recognized federal constitutional childcare interests in such unwed
fathers. Id. at 136 (Brennan, J., concurring). States now vary on whether to give similar
categorical preferences to husbands. See supra note 100. These variations are
permitted as the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, to date, far broader state
lawmaking discretion on questions of defining childcare parentage than on related
privacy questions in such areas as abortion, same sex marriage, and sexual conduct.
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Federal Constitutional Childcare Parents, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
965, 967–68 (2016) (questioning why states have such wide discretion with regards to
defining constitutional child caretakers). So, childrearing opportunities and rights
now operate differently interstate for different classes of unwed biological fathers.
131. 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
132. Id. at 65 (referring to childcare interests as “perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court”); see also id. at 68–69 (“[S]o
long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally
be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further
question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing
of that parent’s children.”). See generally Donald Leo Bach, The Rapanos Rap: Grappling
with Plurality Decisions, 81 U.S.L.W. 468, 468–69 (Oct. 2, 2012) (discussing how to
interpret plurality opinions).
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least some special weight.”133 The plurality, and one concurring
justice, while denying the requested grandparent childcare, reserved
the question of whether any “nonparental” visitation, presumably
encompassing not only grandparents, but also stepparents, siblings,
and others,134 must “include a showing of harm or potential harm to
the child.”135 In his concurrence, Justice Souter hinted that at least
some nonparental visitation could be based solely on a preexisting
“substantial relationship” between a child and a nonparent and on “the
State’s particular best interests standard.”136
Justice Kennedy, in dissent, like Justice Souter, observed that a best
interest standard might be constitutional where the nonparent acted
“in a caregiving role over a significant period of time,”137 suggesting
133. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68, 70 (“[I]f a fit parent’s decision of the kind at issue
here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special
weight to the parent’s own determination.”).
134. See, e.g., James W. v. Claudine W. (In re Marriage of W.), 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461,
464 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (applying Troxel analysis to stepparent visitation request).
135. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 (“[W]e do not consider . . . whether the Due Process
Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or
potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting [nonparent]
visitation.”); id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring); see also McGarity v. Jerrolds, 429 S.W.3d
562, 570–71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (establishing harm where it is required); PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.18(2)(a)(i)
(AM. LAW INST. 2000) [hereinafter 2000 ALI PRINCIPLES] (suggesting that harm is not
always needed to support court orders for childcare and that “a grandparent or other
relative who has developed a significant relationship with the child” can seek childcare,
where “the parent objecting to the allocation has not been performing a reasonable
share of parenting functions for the child”); Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding
the Rights of Third Parties to Seek Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1, 18–23
(2013) (comparing state grandparent and other third-party visitation statutes that do
not explicitly require the loss of a relationship with a third party to cause harm).
136. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 76–78 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that while not every
nonparent should be capable of securing visitation upon demonstrating a child’s best
interests, perhaps a nonparent who establishes “that he or she has a substantial
relationship with the child” should be able to petition if the state chooses). An
exemplary statute is VA. CODE. ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (2017), which states that “[t]he
court shall give due regard to the primacy of the parent-child relationship but may
upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the best interest of the child
would be served thereby award custody or visitation to any other person with a legitimate
interest.” An illustrative case is In re Parental Responsibilities of M.W., 292 P.3d 1158, 1159,
1161 (Colo. App. 2012), which employs COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(1)(c) (2017) to
uphold standing of a former boyfriend of child’s mother seeking allocation of parental
responsibilities, and determined that a showing of the child’s biological parents being
unfit was unnecessary to allow former boyfriend’s action to move forward.
137. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 98–99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that state courts
should be entitled to employ a best interests standard over an “absolute parental veto”
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that such a nonparent might even be afforded “de facto” parent
status.138 Also in dissent, Justice Scalia seemingly agreed, noting the
need for both “gradations” of carefully crafted state law definitions of
parents and nonparents.139 A third dissenter, Justice Stevens, added
that because at least some children in nonparent settings likely “have
fundamental liberty interests” in “preserving established familial or familylike bonds,”140 nonparents seeking childcare must be distinguished by
whether there is a “presence or absence of some embodiment of
family.”141 Thus, while important, current parental objections to
nonparent childcare desires are not necessarily dispositive.142
Since Troxel, the U.S. Supreme Court has said little about nonparent
childcare over the objections of established legal parents. It has not
addressed issues like the special weight, special factors, harm or
potential harm, de facto parenthood, children’s fundamental liberty
interests, or family-like bonds.143 Post-Troxel, state legislatures have
for cases where a third party has “developed a relationship with a child” and has acted
as a caregiver for a “significant period of time”).
138. Id. at 100–01 (“[A] fit parent’s right vis-à-vis a complete stranger is one thing;
her right vis-à-vis another parent or a de facto parent may be another.”).
139. Id. at 92–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Judicial vindication of ‘parental rights’ . . .
requires . . . judicially defined gradations of other persons (grandparents, extended
family, adoptive family in an adoption later found to be invalid, long-term guardians,
etc.) who may have some claim against the wishes of the parents.”).
140. Id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
130 (1989) (noting that the Court had not “had occasion to decide whether a child
has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial
relationship”); In re Meridian H., 798 N.W.2d 96, 105–06 (Neb. 2011) (finding no
recognition of a federal or state constitutional right to continuing sibling relationships
with a sister upon the termination of parental rights regarding the sister, where the
sister was placed in foster care and the two older siblings were adopted); Jill Elaine
Hasday, Siblings in Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 897, 931 (2012) (urging courts, legislatures,
and scholars pay better attention to “sibling relationships,” concluding: “Family law’s
narrow focus on marriage and parenthood, inherited from the common law and then
endlessly replicated without normative scrutiny, has constrained critical thinking in
family law for too long”).
141. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Comparably, one parent’s objection to placement for adoption is not always
dispositive when the other parent agrees and placement clearly and convincingly
serves the child’s best interests. See, e.g., In re C.L.O., 41 A.3d 502, 504 (D.C. 2012)
(granting adoption of child despite noncustodial father’s objection).
143. One distinguished scholar commented that the current status of grandparent
visitation rights have been further muddied by the absence of a majority opinion in
Troxel. In addition, the plurality opinion can be read in two ways: the first being a
broad view reaffirming the fit parents’ constitutional right to control the care of their
child which would invalidate any visitation objection brought by grandparents, and the
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refined their third-party childcare laws,144 including crafting new
special grandparent childcare statutes.145 As state high courts have
heard challenges to these nonparent childcare laws in the wake of
Troxel,146 state legislators and judges have expressed differing values
when addressing what can justify judicial interference with parental
“liberty interests” via court orders on third-party childcare over current
parental objections.147 Specifically, legislators and judges have crafted
different standards on “harm or potential harm,” “special factors,” and
“special weight.” As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, the
regulation of many aspects of domestic relations rests within the
“virtually exclusive province of the States.”148
Whatever the federal constitutional contours of nonparental
childcare opportunities over parental objections, certainly there is little
to date indicating parental childcare rights limit possible nonparental
child support mandates directly related to court-recognized nonparental
childcare. Reasonable conditions can attach to court-sanctioned

second being a more narrow decision that allowed grandparent visitation under a
particularly broad law, despite the parent being fit.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 833 (4th ed. 2011).
144. For a review of general third-party childcare statutes, see, e.g., Atkinson, supra
note 135, at 18–23.
145. See Robyn L. Ginsberg, Comment, Grandparents’ Visitation Rights: The
Constitutionality of New York’s Domestic Relations Law Section 72 After Troxel v. Granville,
65 ALB. L. REV. 205, 205–06 n.2 (2001) (listing various grandparent visitation statutes).
146. See Sonya C. Garza, The Troxel Aftermath: A Proposed Solution for State Courts and
Legislatures, 69 LA. L. REV. 927, 929 (2009) (reviewing post-Troxel state cases on the
constitutionality of such statutes); Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t
Know Best: Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV.
865, 875–77 (2003) (exploring earlier review of such statutes).
147. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 135, at 18 (demonstrating variations in, inter alia,
laws on great-grandparents; burden of proof; and necessity to show harm). Interstate
variations also appear for state law definitions of parents and for state laws on
stepparent visitations. See, e.g., Parentage Law (R)Evolution, supra note 45, at 752–63
(discussing parents); Jeffrey A. Parness, Survey of Illinois Law: Stepparent Childcare, 38 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 575, 588–89 (2014) (discussing stepparents).
148. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (upholding residency requirement for
divorce petitioner). But see Courtney G. Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 90 IND. L.J.
787, 798–815 (2015) (describing the long history of some federal family status
determinations). Of course, the states may provide greater protections of parental
rights than are afforded by the federal constitution. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hunter, 771
N.W.2d 694, 711 (Mich. 2009) (“Nothing in Troxel can be interpreted as precluding
states from offering greater protection to the fundamental parenting rights of natural
parents, regardless of whether the natural parents are fit. This rule applies here.”).

2018] DE FACTO PARENT & NONPARENT CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS

797

childcare exercised by nonparents, including certain required
financial child support, as with providing food and shelter.
Beyond such in-care support, courts should be able to enforce
agreements by nonparent child-caretakers to provide additional child
support directly to parents. These agreements could continue to
operate, depending on their terms, whether or not nonparent
childcare continues.
Such agreements may be independently
executed between nonparents and parents, or constitute portions of
larger agreements, like premarital or marriage dissolution pacts
between parents. Clarification on how these agreements should
operate would also provide some insight on how nonparent childcare
rights affect nonparent child support obligations.
C.

Limits on De Facto Parent or Nonparent Child Support
when There Is No Accompanying Childcare

Financial child support obligations of eligible de facto parent and
nonparent child-caretakers are unlikely to inhibit the superior
parental rights of existing legal parents (who are also liable for such
support) when there is no corresponding childcare.149 Of course, child
support obligations for de facto parents and nonparents do implicate
their due process property interests. But at least some such duties can
be rationalized as serving children’s interests and as fair to the obligors,
like Antonyio Johnson, such as when the obligors knowingly developed
significant, if not parental-like, relationships with the children who
reasonably became dependent on, if not reasonably anticipated, further
support.150 Thus, financial support duties are reasonable when obligors
promised future support, even if there is no childcare by those obligors.
Whether there are one or two (or more) legal parents with child
support obligations, child support assessments against new or earlierrecognized de facto parents do not require judicial recognitions of
possible childcare interests involving custody, visitation, or the like. A

149. See Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 750 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (ruling that it
was unconstitutional to designate one a “de facto” parent for childcare purposes where
there are already two existing parents; any extension of “the sacred right of
parenthood to more than two people dilutes the constitutional rights of the two
parents”). Yet in Louisiana, childcare can be ordered for three parents. See, e.g., T.D.
v. M.M.M., 730 So. 2d 873, 877 (La. 1999) (allowing standing for court to determine
more than two parents for a child), abrogated by 898 So. 2d 1260 (2005).
150. Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d 97, 100–01 (N.D. 2000) (finding the trial court erred in not
recognizing Antonyio Johnson equitably adopted child (and his potential liability for financial
child support obligations) after ten years of acting as a parent-like caregiver to child).

798

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:769

biological father already may be ordered to support a child for whom
that father had, or currently has, no childcare standing.151 Thus, a
biological father of a child born of sex can have child support
obligations where he never developed a relationship with the child
prompting childcare opportunities,152 or when he developed a parentchild relationship, but later abandoned the child.153 A late-arriving
biological father who first obtains a childcare order long after birth
can have retroactive support duties for the time he was unaware of his
fatherhood.154 Similarly, one who attained de facto parent status for
childcare purposes, but later abandoned the child, might still be liable
for child support.155 Further, one who could have attained de facto
parent childcare, but never sought it, might be liable for child support,
as when a female spouse or partner of a birth mother earlier agreed to
co-parent a child born of assisted reproduction but later declined to

151. See, e.g., Still v. Hayman, 794 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (affirming
that being a biological father is enough to support a childcare obligation even though
the birth mother told the man he was not the child’s father).
152. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (holding that the
Constitution requires a state to consider a biological father’s opinion only when it is
in the child’s best interest and he has been active in the child’s life); see also N.E. v.
Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a biological father’s due process
claim because there is no fairness requirement in child care proceedings); Still, 794
N.E.2d at 754 (noting that child care support matters are independent from visitation
and custody disputes); Commonwealth ex rel. Zercher v. Bankert, 405 A.2d 1266, 1269
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (“Generally, matters of support are separate and independent
from problems of visitation and custody, and ordinarily a support order must be paid
regardless of whether the wife is wrongfully denying the father’s right to visitation.”).
153. See, e.g., In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 745 n.4 (Iowa 2011) (highlighting that some states
allow the continuation of a child support obligation past the termination of parental rights).
154. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.131 (West 2014) (listing the factors to be
employed in ordering such support). Biological dads can also owe child support to
adult children via orders of retroactive support, even when the dads reasonably
thought they had settled their obligations in earlier child support cases brought by the
birth mothers on behalf of the children. See Knapp v. Bayless, No. 00CA008796, 2006
WL 2466597, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2006) (describing a situation where a birth
mother was no longer in privity with her child after she settled and during such
proceedings did not consider the child’s best interests during the settlement process).
155. See, e.g., State of Kansas/State of Iowa ex rel. Sec’y of Soc. & Rehab. Servs. v.
Bohrer, 189 P.3d 1157, 1159–60 (Kan. 2008) (holding a father responsible for funds
expended on behalf of his child even when the child now has a separate permanent
guardian). Consider as well a possible child support order against a former lesbian
partner of a birth mother where the former partner initially, but not later on, assumed
a presumed second parent status by undertaking both childcare and child support.
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pursue childcare when the couple’s relationship ended.156 To be fair,
usually there should be no involuntary child support obligations for
those who some may have viewed as parental figures, but who never
had the possibility to attain de facto childcare parent status, like those
living with a single custodial parent for some duration and, during the
residence, merely volunteered certain assistance out of “kindness.”157
Some nonparents are not like biological, adoptive, or eligible de facto
parents who are eligible for but do not seek childcare. Nonparents may
be eligible for childcare orders over the objections of established
parents even when none of the following situations exist: they have
not developed parental-like relationships with the children, have not
necessarily assumed open-ended financial commitments to the
children on which the children and their parents have depended, and
have not been generally viewed in the community as being financially
responsible for the children (as occurs when nonparents have resided
with children and held out the children as within their core or nuclear
family). Thus, because of their substantive due process interests, some
nonparents who are eligible for third-party childcare, but who have not
pursued such childcare, should not be available for court-ordered
involuntary child support. Such nonparents include grandparents in
whose home their child and grandchild resided for some extended time.158
A different question is whether nonparents eligible for childcare,
who pursued childcare over established parent objections but were
denied, should be available for involuntary child support paid to the
established parents. Here we also believe the answer should (often)
be no. Constitutional constraints on unwanted and unexpected financial
obligations can sometimes outweigh the best interest of children. Initial
child support orders can prompt “lifelong”159 financial and personal
impacts on the obligors. Generally, there should be no court156. See, e.g., Chambers v. Chambers, No. CN99-09493, 2005 WL 645220, at *1–2
(Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 12, 2005) (holding that a former lesbian partner must pay child
support although they did not fall into the statutory definition of a parent), abrogated
by Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730 (2010).
157. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing that in
Nicholas H. v. Kimberly H., 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002), the court cautioned against
assuming that every man who lives with a woman when she is pregnant and after the
child is born necessarily becomes a presumed father of the child).
158. See supra notes 74–77 (highlighting special New York, Alaska, Georgia, and
North Dakota grandchild visitation laws).
159. See Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 584 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Most of us
see parenthood as a lifelong status whose responsibilities flow from a wellspring far
more profound than legal decree.”).
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compelled support by grandparents who simply opened their homes
to their children and grandchildren, but were later denied third-party
visitation after the children and grandchildren relocated. By contrast,
child support should be possible for some grandparents who were
denied third-party visitation over the objections of the established parents,
as where the grandparents had developed relationships similar to “parentchild” relationships which were later abandoned by the grandparents,160 or
when the grandparents served as “primary” caretakers for some
extended time with promises of continuing care and/or financial
support, but later voluntarily abandoned the caretaking and support,
leaving the child in dire straits.161
Due to their substantial interference with individual rights and
familial relations, court orders directing nonconsenting de facto
parents or nonparents to provide support without also recognizing
accompanying childcare by the obligors should carry a high burden of
proof. Though only money may be involved, the financial obligations
of child support should differ significantly from other financial
obligations arising from court judgments.162
As noted, de facto parents or nonparents with no (current) childcare
may be obligated to pay child support to the childcare parents via
agreements. Such agreements may be independently made with a
childcare parent or with all childcare parents, or may be concurrently
made with other agreements, like those between childcare parents
involving premarital, midmarriage or marriage dissolution pacts.163

160. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 767.43 (1) (2017) (detailing third-party visitation requirements).
161. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29 (2013) (listing third-party visitation rights).
162. See Rivera, 483 U.S. at 583–84 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The financial
commitment imposed upon a losing defendant in a paternity suit is thus far more
onerous and unpredictable than the liability borne by the loser in a typical civil suit.”);
see also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 14 (1981) (holding that under the Due Process
Clause, indigent defendants have the right to government-paid blood grouping tests
when sued for child support to “help to insure the correctness of paternity decisions”).
163. See, e.g., Fraizer v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 545–46 (Kan. 2013) (upholding
same sex couple’s co-parenting agreement); see also In re Marriage of Purcell, 825
N.E.2d 724, 728–29 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that a birth mother’s earlier jointparenting agreement with her husband was still enforceable even after lack of
biological ties was proven); C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 524 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1994)
(establishing paternity rights for a sperm donor).
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DE FACTO PARENT CHILD SUPPORT: CURRENT LAWS, MODELS
AND PRINCIPLES

State laws on when and where those actually or possibly classified as
de facto parents are eligible for child support are numerous and lack
uniformity. While lawmakers must ultimately establish the child
support norms within their own borders, there are several uniform laws
on parentage, childcare, and child support which demonstrate some
consensus. It is instructive then to look at model rules and principles
against the backdrop of variability among state laws.
A.

Current State Laws

As noted, de facto childcare parentage arises in American states
under differing names, with differing imprecise standards, and
through differing lawmakers. Regardless of these differences, de facto
parents often stand in parity with other childcare parents recognized
under precise standards, which includes birth mothers, acknowledged
biological fathers, and those who formally adopt children. At least
some de facto parents seemingly have child support duties to their
children like other legal parents. Thus, in Delaware, once de facto
parentage164 or presumed parentage165 is established under imprecise
legal norms, the “parent-child relationship . . . applies for all purposes,
except as otherwise specifically provided.”166 And in Maine, once a
court adjudicates “a person to be a de facto parent,”167 the person is a
parent “for all purposes, except as otherwise specifically provided.”168
In some states explicit support statutes seemingly are required.169
Final child support orders can be secured from those established as
de facto parents, whether or not they seek childcare orders.170 Interim
child support orders, however, may not be comparably available
164. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2009).
165. § 8-204(a)(5).
166. § 8-203; see also § 501(a) (“[D]uty to support a child under the age of 18 . . .
rests primarily upon the child’s parents.”).
167. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1891(1) (2016).
168. § 1853.
169. See, e.g., Price v. Price, No. W2012-01501-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 1701814, at *2
(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2013) (“[A]ny obligation to pay child support must arise from
Tennessee’s statutes.”).
170. See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 177 (Wash. 2005) (en banc)
(authorizing a court to consider an award of parental rights based on the best interest
of the child). But see, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005)
(finding that de facto parents that voluntary accept obligations of parenthood can be
liable for childcare orders).
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against all alleged de facto parents. Thus, in Maine, interim child
support orders are statutorily available against those “[p]etitioning to
have parentage adjudicated,” which include alleged de facto parents
seeking childcare orders.171 Yet there, interim orders are not
statutorily available against alleged de facto parents pursued for child
support by others, including by legal parents.172 Elsewhere, interim
child support from alleged de facto parents, as during divorce
proceedings, are available.173 In some locales, temporary child support
orders during a divorce proceeding seemingly are available against
imprecisely defined parents, who will not be responsible for permanent
support payments because the parentage norms are more stringent.174
Cases differ on whether, and, if so, how far, child support duties can
arise from common law doctrines untethered to any statutes.175
Judicial reluctance can arise not only where common law de facto
parent childcare doctrines are rejected on separation of powers
grounds, but also where there are statutes on de facto parent childcare
that are silent on de facto parent child support. Conceivably, common
law de facto parent child support orders benefitting, for example,
biological parents who share in childcare might be limited to settings
where there is actually exercised de facto parent childcare.176
171. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1840(1)(B).
172. § 1840(1). Of course, it is possible common law support duties might be
recognized. Compare, e.g., Dep’t of Healthcare & Fam. Servs. ex. rel. Nieto v. Arevalo, 68
N.E.3d 552, 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (considering Illinois’s procedural and substantive
law, the trial court properly looked to state statutes, because there is no blanket
common-law duty of support), with Wright v. Wright, 164 A.2d 317, 319 (Del. 1960)
(stating that statutes were not intended to abrogate or modify the civil liability of a
father to support his children during their minority), and Ruben v. Ruben, 461 A.2d 733,
735 (N.H. 1983) (“At common law there was no obligation to support a stepchild, and only
recently has such an obligation been imposed by statute in a few jurisdictions.”).
173. Whitlock v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 497 N.W.2d 891, 894–95 (Iowa 1993) (requiring former
stepfather to pay temporary child support while the dissolution case proceeded).
174. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 359 (N.J. 1984) (noting that the norms
on a “pendente lite” child support order against a stepfather are different, and easier,
than norms for “permanent support”).
175. Compare, e.g., Wright, 164 A.2d at 319 (considering legislative intent, common
law support duties of a husband can reach beyond statutes), with Dep’t of Healthcare
& Fam. Servs. ex rel. Nieto, 68 N.E.3d at 560–61 (holding that, in Illinois, there is no
blanket common law action for child support where a child is born of sex, though
there are such claims in artificial insemination cases), and Bowden v. Korslin, No.
2011AP2660, 2013 WL 4746428, at *10 n.3 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2013) (finding no
child support flowing from equitable parent to biological parent).
176. See, e.g., 2017 UPA § 609(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (stating that an adjudication
of de facto parentage can only be pursued in court by one seeking de facto parent status).
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Unfortunately, there are few pre-birth opportunities for unwed
expectant mothers to establish prospective parentage in expectant
biological fathers to secure pregnancy-related financial support that
would promote live and healthy births.177 The unavailability (including
prohibitive cost) of pre-birth genetic testing where alleged male
parentage is founded on consensual sex should not foreclose such
opportunities.
Pre-birth voluntary paternity acknowledgements
(where available) signed by unwed mothers and fathers typically do not
require testing.178 While post-birth child support orders can operate
retroactively so as to encompass, for example, the medical expenses
attending pregnancy and birth,179 sound public policy favors at least
some opportunities for pre-birth child support orders, as money is
often much needed by expectant mothers and its receipt will promote
the birth of healthier babies to healthier mothers.
In Hawaii, a voluntary paternity acknowledgment may be returned
prior to a child’s birth.180 This opportunity for a pre-birth paternity
designation makes sense even though a later live birth is uncertain. In
the time prior to a live birth where a man believes he is the biological
father, this designation allows him to protect his hearing rights in any
later adoption cases pursued by third parties. Unwed pregnant women
will be more assured that paternal child support, and perhaps childcare,
will follow live births and that pregnancy support will be provided by
prospective biological fathers.181 Unwed prospective biological fathers
can establish their paternal rights even if their unwed pregnant girlfriends
later leave them during pregnancy or post-birth for new partners.
Where pre-birth pregnancy support orders are unavailable, there
can be later court orders assessing the costs of an earlier pregnancy.
Such orders should be available even when no live birth ensues,
especially (but perhaps not only) if later birth is not foreclosed by a
legal abortion. In 2014, the Indiana Court of Appeals recognized that
where the State expended funds for medical assistance afforded a

177. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7633 (West 2013) (allowing for parentage
determinations to be brought before the birth of the child although enforcement will
be stayed until after the child’s birth).
178. See Jeffery A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John Edwards: More
and Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 64 (2010)
(explaining that states typically do not require testing for paternity acknowledgments).
179. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-8(4) (2015).
180. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 584-3.5 (LexisNexis 2015).
181. See Ronald Mincy et al., In-Hospital Paternity Establishment and Father Involvement
in Fragile Families, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 611, 611 (2005).
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pregnant woman, it could recoup those costs after birth from the
prospective biological father even when the pregnancy ended in
stillbirth.182 Some post-pregnancy monetary recovery should also be
available to women who do not receive state aid during pregnancy.
Both pre-birth and post-birth pregnancy support orders against de
facto parents are far more difficult to obtain than pregnancy support
orders against biological parents, actual or presumed (as with men or
women married to expectant mothers during pregnancies).
Conceivably, one could reside with a pregnant woman long enough
during her pregnancy while holding out her unborn child as one’s own
to qualify for pre-birth de facto parent status, so that upon
discontinuance of the residence during pregnancy, support could be
ordered pre-birth or post-birth (to apply retroactively). Comparably,
but far more likely, one could be a pre-birth or post-birth de facto
parent with pregnancy support duties via intended parentage laws,
especially in assisted reproduction settings, as with female partners
who contribute no genetic material while their mates conceive and
then bear children they earlier agreed to raise jointly.
The recent surge in new de facto parent childcare laws, both via
statutes and judicial precedents, clearly have undermined—if not more
directly negated—earlier precedents on child support through the
equitable estoppel doctrine.183 Often the doctrine would not allow a child
support order against one who is now covered by de facto parent laws.
Equitable estoppel could be used both affirmatively and defensively.
It could be used affirmatively, as by stepparents, to establish childcare
interests or child support duties over the objections of their former
partners—the natural parents who are estopped.184 Alternatively, it
could be used defensively, as by stepfathers, to counter requests by
birth mothers for post dissolution child support orders.185 Currently,
there is no major precedent on how the more expansive de facto
parent laws have superseded the equitable estoppel doctrine.
182. J.W. v. C.M., 9 N.E.3d 202, 208 & n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (explaining that the
state could not pursue alleged unwed biological father in paternity where there were no
state funds expended, even when the prospective mother and her family members
wished to establish paternity “for purposes of closure, respect, and learning the truth”).
183. See William C. Duncan, The Legal Fiction of De Facto Parenthood, 36 J. LEGIS. 263,
270 (2010).
184. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479, 480 (Iowa 1995)
(preventing birth mother from denying equitable parenthood in her former spouse).
185. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Jefferson, 137 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)
(denying wife’s petition for equitable parent-child relationship because husband
showed no equitable estoppel).
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Equitable estoppel precedents typically recognize only limited
opportunities for child support orders against soon-to-be exstepparents, especially those who will not continue their stepparentstepchild relationships following divorce. These limitations are
illustrated by a precedent recognizing former stepparent child support
only where the stepparent engaged in “fraudulent activity” or there was
“unusual hardship to the child if the support obligation were not
imposed.”186 Another even more restrictive precedent demanded that
a stepparent “actively” interfered with the child’s support from a
natural parent.187 Yet another case required that support be available
only if there was an “unequivocal representation of intent to support
the child,” together with “reliance” by a natural parent and “detriment
to the natural parent or child.”188
While equitable estoppel precedents on child support are scarce,
these precedents are superseded in states with broader de facto
childcare parent laws. Such laws apply, for example, when stepparents
hold out children as their own while receiving them in their homes,
thus attaining de facto childcare parent status designated as on par
with natural or adoptive parent status.189
B.

Models and Principles

When assessing possible child support for de facto parents (and for
nonparents, including stepparents and grandparents), American state
lawmakers often look to the models (e.g., proposed statutes) and
principles (e.g., best practices guidelines) of prominent advisory
groups like the ALI and the NCCUSL. Both legislatures and courts
have followed their advice in interpreting and/or reforming existing
state laws on child support obligations.

186. Weinand v. Weinand, 616 N.W.2d 1, 7–8 (Neb. 2000) (holding that an ex-husband
was not obligated under Nebraska law to pay child support for ex-wife’s child).
187. Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 359 (N.J. 1984) (finding that a natural father
was not required to pay child support for his two daughters because the children’s
stepfather actively prevented him from providing support).
188. Ulrich v. Cornell, 484 N.W.2d 545, 548 (Wis. 1992) (explaining that a husband
is not precluded from denying responsibility to support his stepson after separation
from natural mother despite hiring an attorney who handled the termination of his
parental rights and initiated adoption proceedings).
189. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-203 (2009) (stating that presumed
parenthood “applies for all purposes”); see also § 8-204(a)(5) (noting that a presumed
parent can be someone who resides with a child while holding out the child as one’s
own).
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1.

American Law Institute
The ALI, via its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, lays out
the important factors for determining when parents are potentially
responsible for court-ordered child support.190 The ALI objectives on
child support involve both economic and noneconomic policies.
Thus, the ALI posits that while “[s]ociety has an interest in not being
called upon to support children whose parents have adequate
resources,” the state should provide support where needed to prevent
“a grievous harm to children [and] an unwise underinvestment in a
vital social resource.”191 Further, the ALI child support principles seek
to ensure that a child has “a minimum decent standard of living” and
does “not suffer loss of important life opportunities,” while at the same
time not “impoverishing either parent” or creating “undue
hardship[s] to themselves or their other dependents.”192
As to the (actual or potential) parents, the Principles are expansive.
The definition of a parent, utilized during judicial assessments allocating
“custodial and decision-making responsibility for . . . child[ren]” whose
parents do not live together,193 includes a “legal parent,” an individual
defined as a “parent under other state law”; a “parent by estoppel,” an
individual, “though not a legal parent,” who is obligated to pay child
support or who lived with the child while “accepting full and
permanent responsibilities as a parent”; and a “de facto parent,” an
“individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel,” who for
a “significant” time lived with the child and either formed “a parentchild relationship” with “the agreement of a legal parent” or regularly
performed “caretaking functions.”194
While the Principles chiefly focus on the child support obligations
stemming from legally recognized and exercised childcare parentage,
there is also some recognition of the possibility of child support
obligations of persons who were eligible for, but did not seek, parental
childcare status. The Principles recognize child support can extend
beyond (actual or presumed) biological or adoptive parents to persons
“defined as a parent under state law.”195
190. 2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 135.
191. Id. § 3.04 cmt. b.
192. Id. § 3.04(1)–(2) (weighing the interests of the child, the parents, and society
so that all interested parties are satisfied with a child support decision).
193. Id. § 2.01.
194. Id. § 2.03(1)(a)–(c) (emphasis omitted).
195. Id. §§ 3.01, 3.02(1)(a) (discussing the principles governing a parent’s child
support obligation and defining a parent).
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In contrast to the Principles, the ALI has not yet discussed child
support in its 2016 ALI Restatement draft.196 Here, the ALI expands
upon the economic purpose for child support laid out in the
Principles, saying child support directs children toward “selfsufficiency”197 and “financial security”198 by the time a child becomes
an adult.199 Support must be “reasonable,” so that if “a parent can
afford a necessary expense, the parent is obligated to pay for it.”200 The
2016 ALI Restatement draft makes clear that any obligation to provide
“economic support exists even if the parent does not maintain a
relationship with the child.”201 The draft has yet to address de facto
parent or nonparent child support.
2.

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws:
Uniform Parentage Acts
NCCUSL approved the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act202 to replace
the 2002 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)203 (which replaced the 1973
UPA). Tracking the evolution of the UPA demonstrates how NCCUSL
has changed its views on parentage, specifically in regard to presumed
and de facto childcare parentage as opposed to biological or adoptive
childcare parentage. Of course, childcare parentage has implications
for child support.
a. 1973 Uniform Parentage Act
In 1973, NCCUSL approved the first UPA. It defines the legal
parent-child relationship between adults and children, with the
relationships sometimes conferring “rights” and/or imposing

196. RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW xi (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft
No. 2, 2016) (“The Section on parents’ duty to provide economic support is relatively
straightforward and requires little discussion. It largely tracks Sections covering this
material in the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution.”).
197. Id. § 2.1 cmt. d.
198. Id. § 2.1 cmt. e.
199. See id. § 2.1(b) (defining an adult as eighteen years old for high-school
graduates, or up to twenty-one years old for those who have not graduated highschool); see also id. § 2.1(c) (“A court may order a parent to provide economic support
to an adult child enrolled in an institution of higher education or vocational training
until the adult child reaches age [twenty-three].”).
200. Id. § 2.1 cmt. c.
201. Id. § 2.1 cmt. g.
202. 2017 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
203. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
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“obligations.”204 The 1973 UPA narrowly defines the parent-child
relationship, focusing on biological or adoptive ties.205 It makes no
explicit reference to de facto parent, stepparent, grandparent, or other
nonbiological or nonadoptive parentage. Even so, there are instances
where nonbiological or non-formal adoptive parents can not only
secure parental rights, but also be assessed parental obligations.
Under the 1973 UPA, a man is presumed to be a biological parent
when he has been married to the biological mother of the child and
“the child is born during the marriage,”206 or when he and the
biological mother attempted to marry each other “before the child’s
birth.”207 Further, a presumption of paternity arises upon certain
affirmative acts taken by a presumed father after a child is born,
including marriage,208 holding the child out as one’s own,209 and
acknowledging paternity in writing.210 With such actions, assuming
paternity is not later overcome, a man with no biological ties to a child
can be a child’s legal parent. Certain parties can bring actions to
determine parentage, including an “interested party,”211 a grandparent,212
or one pursuing enforcement of an agreement to provide child
support.213 Such actions clearly include a proceeding seeking child
support. For example, the 1973 UPA declares a paternity suit can

204. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
205. Id. § 3 (explaining that “[t]he parent and child relationship between a child
and” either “the natural mother,” “natural father,” or “an adoptive parent” will be
established through the act, but these are the only three adults who are recognized as
parents under the 1973 UPA).
206. Id. § 4(a)(1).
207. Id. § 4(a)(2).
208. Id. § 4(a)(3) (noting that such affirmative acts may include a paternity
acknowledgment, a birth certificate recognition, or a written promise or court order
to support the child).
209. Id. § 4(a)(4) (requiring receipt of “the child into his home” as well).
210. Id. § 4(a)(5) (noting that filing with a state, either a court or a Vital Statistics
Office, is an affirmative act creating a presumption of paternity).
211. Id. § 6(b) (directing that “[a]ny interested party may bring an action at any
time for the purpose” of proving or rebutting a presumption of paternity in § 4).
212. Id. § 6(c) (stating that a “personal representative or a parent” of a deceased
natural parent may bring an action to prove or rebut a paternity presumption).
213. Id. § 22(a). “Any promise in writing” to provide support which grows out of “a
supposed or alleged” father and child relationship does not require consideration and
is enforceable; for us such agreements include pacts between a birth mother and a
grandparent (i.e., the parent of a “deadbeat” father), a live in boyfriend who alleges
paternity, or an ex-husband. Id.
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prompt a settlement involving “a defined economic obligation . . . in favor
of the child” by a man who is not “determined” to be the legal father.214
Paternity presumptions arising from residency and holding out
children as one’s own provide significant opportunities for child
support from those with no biological or formal adoptive ties. Such
presumptions arise under the 1973 UPA when a man, “while the child
is under the age of majority, . . . receives the child into his home and
openly holds out the child as his natural child.”215 Here, there is no
specific requirement that such a presumed parent, or another
parent—typically a birth mother—have any reason to believe the man
is, in fact, the natural father.216 Equality principles, as well as public
policy, should extend this presumption, where it is used, to a woman
who comparably resides with and holds out a child,217 assuming a lack
of biological ties does not always overcome the presumption.
Further,
paternity
presumptions
arising
from
written
acknowledgments provide at least some opportunities for child
support without biological or formal adoptive ties. Acknowledgments,
at least in the 1970s, were typically undertaken by men who proclaimed
natural ties to children born of sex.218 Yet, because genetic testing was
not required, both men who were mistaken about their natural
parentage and those who misrepresented possible natural ties could
still become presumed childcare parents. Despite proof that a man
lacked natural ties, courts overriding these acknowledgments were
inconsistent and uncertain.219
Differing paternity establishment norms for artificial insemination
births were contemplated under the 1973 UPA. The Act invited state
legislators to craft such norms,220 though it provided a model for births
undertaken by married, opposite sex couples.221
That model

214. Id. § 13(a)(2).
215. Id. § 4(a)(4).
216. Id. § 4 cmt.
217. See Henderson v. Adams, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1076 (S.D. Ind. 2016) (relying
on equal protection to overturn Indiana statutes that discriminated against same-sex
married women); see also In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 98 A.3d 494, 501 (N.H.
2014) (relying on the public policy underlying the statute to grant same-sex married
women the same presumption as men).
218. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (a)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
219. See Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part I. Disestablishing the Paternity of
Non-Marital Children, 37 Fam. L.Q. 35, 37 (2003).
220. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
221. Id. § 5(a).
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recognized the parentage of a husband whose wife delivered a child
born with the sperm of another man.222
The 1973 UPA does not broadly address de facto childcare parentage.
Thus, adults who for some time performed parental functions but then
lost or ended their relationship with the biological or adoptive childcare
parents would have no opportunity for childcare, and likely no child
support duty absent contracted obligations. Because the 1973 UPA did
not expressly recognize either the parental-like acts of many nonbiological
and nonadoptive child-caretakers or many other forms of intended
parentage, especially in assisted reproduction settings, NCCUSL later
decided it needed to expand the scope of parental childcare interests.223
b. 2002 Uniform Parentage Act
In 2000, with amendments in 2002, NCCUSL updated the 1973 UPA
to recognize additional nonbiological and nonadoptive legal
parents.224 The 2002 UPA focused primarily on parentage in assisted
reproduction settings. Outside of assisted reproduction, biology
(actual or presumed) and formal adoption remained significant
methods by which adults would become legal parents. Provisions on
marital paternity presumptions and paternity acknowledgments
remained.225 Yet, unlike the 1973 UPA, the 2002 UPA no longer
presumed “natural” ties in these provisions, presumably meaning the
parentage of husbands and acknowledging fathers with no biological
ties might be more difficult to overcome.226
As noted, the 1973 UPA included very little on assisted
reproduction.227 By 2000, assisted reproduction practices had become
more available, drawing the attention of NCCUSL.228 The 2002 UPA

222. Id. § 5(a)–(b) (noting that “consent” of husband is required as well as the
“supervision of a licensed physician”).
223. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
224. Id. With changes in state law, the new UPA seeks “to clarify the participants in
determinations of parentage and adapt the Act to recent scientific developments . . .
while eliminating the ambiguous term ‘natural’” and to expand potential parents who
are involved in assisted reproduction and surrogacy. Id.
225. Id. § 201(b)(1)–(2).
226. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973), with UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
227. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (“This Act does
not deal with many complex and serious legal problems raised by the practice of
artificial insemination.”).
228. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 7 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (discussing the
development of assisted reproduction and how it now requires analysis).
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distinguishes anonymous or charitable sperm donors229 from donors
providing genetic materials with parental intentions.230 As long as a
donor signed a consent to the assisted reproduction indicating
parental intentions and did not rescind that consent, the donor is
presumed to be the parent of any resulting child.231 However, where a
donor’s intentions on parentage have changed, the 2002 UPA makes
it clear that the lack of parental intent, rather than genetics, governs,
though the result may be that the child has only one legal parent.232
Throughout the 2002 UPA, intent is the key factor when determining
childcare parentage for children born of assisted reproduction.
Article 3 of the 2002 UPA provides greater detail in the efforts that
are necessary to establish presumed paternity through the Voluntary
Acknowledgment of Paternity.233 As with the 1973 UPA, as long as
acknowledgments go unchallenged and unrescinded,234 men that sign
acknowledgments are deemed legal fathers of children born of sex,
even if there are no actual biological ties.235 While this opens the door to
some nonbiological, nonadoptive parents, as did the aforementioned
elimination of the “natural” ties presumption,236 generally the 2002 UPA

229. Id. § 702 (“A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted
reproduction.”); id. § 702 cmt. (explaining that § 702 “shields all donors, whether of
sperm or eggs . . . from parenthood” where the donor and the biological parent have
no intention of being the child’s parent).
230. Id. § 703 cmt. (emphasizing that due to the high increase in assisted
reproduction technology (ART) “it is crucial to clarify the parentage of all of the
children born as a result” of ART); see also id. § 704 (noting that consent by a man
and/or woman intending to be the parents of an ART child must make an officially
signed record, although failure to do so immediately does not bar a finding of
paternity when residence with the child and “openly [holding] out the child as [his or
her] own” are established).
231. Id. §§ 703–706.
232. Id. § 706 cmt. (“[T]he child will have a genetic father, but not a legal father.
In this instance, intention, rather than biology, is the controlling factor [in establishing
legal parentage].”).
233. See id. § 302 (discussing acknowledgement of paternity).
234. See id. § 307. A man may rescind his acknowledgment of paternity within sixty
days of filing. Id. § 307(1). If a man rescinds after sixty days, he must demonstrate
fraud or duress, and file for rescission within two years of the original
acknowledgment. Id. § 308(a).
235. See id. § 305(a)–(b) (noting that “a valid acknowledgment of paternity”
properly filed is the same as “an adjudication of paternity of a child”; conversely, a valid
acknowledgment of paternity in combination with a denial of parentage by the
presumed father is “equivalent to an adjudication of the nonpaternity” of the
presumed father).
236. See supra note 99.
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perpetuates the genetic relationship norm. The 2002 UPA seeks to bar
adult men who have no genetic ties to children from acknowledging
paternity237 “to avoid a possible subversion of the requirements for an
adoption.”238 A nonparent, including a stepparent, who was not in a
marital relationship with a birth mother, either before or immediately
after birth, had few avenues to legal parentage outside of formal
adoption.239 Lack of legal parent opportunity exists even where the
nonparent performed all the functions of a parent in settings where
both the nonparent and child each consider they are in a parent-child
relationship.240 In other words, child support orders against those we
now call de facto parents remained generally unavailable.
Beyond acknowledgements, available options for nonbiological and
nonadoptive child support parentage for children born of sex to others
included in 2002, as in 1973, parentage presumptions arising from
residencies with children while holding them out as their own. The
2002 provisions, however, differed significantly from the 1973
provisions. They more stringently demanded not only residing in the
same household, but also holding out “for the first two years of the
child’s life.”241 Consequently, one major avenue to de facto parent
child support was narrowed.
As to parentage for those with no biological or formal adoptive ties
in artificial insemination settings, as noted, the 2002 UPA goes where
the 1973 Act did not go, focusing on parental intentions. For example,
it allows wed and unwed couples to undertake intended parentage for
a woman who gives birth and a man who was not the sperm donor.242
As to births to married women, husbands who did not provide sperm
may only contest their presumed paternity in limited settings.243

237. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 302 cmt. (“A would-be ‘father’ whose parentage of a
child has been excluded by genetic testing may not validly sign an acknowledgment
once that fact has been established.”).
238. Id.
239. See id. § 204(a)(5) (recognizing that a man may be a presumed father if he
resides in the same household as the child for the first two years of the child’s life).
240. See id. § 201 (noting that nonparents can establish a parent-child relationship
through adoption of the child or by consent to assisted reproduction).
241. Id. § 204(a)(5).
242. Id. §§ 703–704 (discussing consent requirements).
243. Id. § 705(a) (stating that a husband can only challenge paternity if he moves
to adjudicate paternity within two years of the child’s birth and the court finds he did
not consent to assisted reproduction).
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Further, the 2002 UPA allows “intended” parentage for a couple244
employing a gestational mother who agrees to relinquish “all rights
and duties” of parentage otherwise following an “assisted
reproduction” birth.245 These intentions, unlike artificial insemination
of a woman who intends to keep her child, must be validated through
a preconception judicial authorization process.246
The availability of challenges to earlier voluntary parentage
acknowledgments under the 2002 UPA raises some interesting questions
involving child support. For instance, an acknowledgment is void if there
is another known presumed father, “unless a denial of paternity [is]
signed,” which offers a way for a presumed marital father to make way for
the acknowledging father since the child cannot have two legal fathers
under the 2002 UPA.247 While a presumed marital father can abandon
parental rights to a child, thus allowing the parental rights to apply in
favor of another man, the 2002 UPA does not address whether such
abandonment nevertheless requires the man denying paternity to
continue to be eligible for child support.248 Further, while the 2002
UPA implies that a denial of paternity by a presumed marital father has
the effect of complete nonparentage, this is only true if there is a valid
voluntary acknowledgment filed by another man.249 The 2002 UPA
does not address what happens where a presumed marital father waives
paternity in favor of one undertaking a voluntary acknowledgment that
is later successfully rescinded or challenged. Here, a presumed parent
who was at one time free and clear of child support might now be
reestablished as a presumed parent.
After 2002, there were major developments in both human
reproductive technologies and in same sex marital and marital-like
relationships.250 New parentage norms were again deemed warranted.
244. Id. § 801(a) (explaining that a “prospective gestational mother . . . and the
intended parents” may create a gestational agreement).
245. Id. § 801(a)(2).
246. Id. §§ 801(c), 803(a).
247. Id. § 302(b)(1).
248. See id. § 302(b) (discussing voiding of paternity acknowledgements). This gap
in the UPA is particularly problematic when a biological mother who is married to one
man conceives a child with another man, thereby making the spouse the presumed
father. In this scenario, the spouse could deny paternity and be free of all child
support obligations; otherwise, the spouse would be required to provide child support
to his presumed child.
249. Id. § 305(b).
250. See Malini Sangha, Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 805,
806 (2005) (describing ART procedures (e.g., in vitro fertilization, gamete
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2017 Uniform Parentage Act

Like the 1973 and 2002 UPAs, the 2017 UPA lays out de facto
childcare parentage norms in both general and in specific instances.251
However, the 2017 UPA identifies genetic and nongenetic de facto
parental relationships within a broader framework.252 It includes
women as well as men as possible presumed parents.253 It defines (and
distinguishes) de facto parentage based on more expansive adult-child
relationships and intentions as distinct from biology or adoption.254
The broader focus was prompted by changes both in available human
reproduction technologies and family structures.255
As with the 2002 UPA, the 2017 UPA identifies scenarios where
parentage results from assisted reproduction. Unlike its predecessor,
the 2017 UPA is more diligent about keeping the donor and parentage
language gender neutral, recognizing the increasing likelihood that
assisted reproduction is used by same-sex couples.256 Going further,
the 2017 UPA lays out parentage norms when a child is born to a
surrogate,257 whether gestational258 or genetic.259 Its coverage of both
gestational and genetic surrogacy agreements extends the 2002 UPA
policy favoring intentional parentage over genetic parentage in
assisted reproduction settings.

intrafallopian transfer, and zygote intrafallopian transfer), artificial insemination, and
surrogacy and noting that the use of such technologies increased significantly after
1996).
251. See 2017 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
252. Id.
253. Id. § 204(a); id. § 204, cmt. (noting that the change is meant to apply the
parentage presumptions equally to men and women).
254. Id. § 102(3) (defining “[a]lleged genetic parent”); § 102(13) (defining
“[i]ntended parent”).
255. See id. prefatory note (outlining the social and technological changes
prompting updates to the UPA); see also Harry L. Tindall & Elizabeth H. Edwards, The
2017 UPA: Strengthening Protections for Children and Families, FAM. ADVOC., Spring 2017,
at 30–31 (explaining that the 2017 UPA would recognize changes in marital law by
changing Act to reflect children of same sex marriages).
256. See 2017 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 7, cmt. (noting that 2017 UPA Article 7 is to
be updated “so that it applies equally to same-sex couples”).
257. Id. § 809.
258. Id. § 801(2) (noting that a gestational surrogate is “not an intended parent”
and shares no biological, parental ties to the intended child, but carries the genetic
child of one or two other people).
259. Id. § 801(1) (explaining that a genetic surrogate is not an intended, legal
parent, but is one of the genetic parents of the child).
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The 2017 UPA continues earlier parentage policies by allowing
nonbiological and nonadoptive adults to become presumed (though
not “natural”) parents in several ways. A stepparent will be a presumed
parent if the stepparent is married to the “woman who gave birth to
the child” and “the child is born during the marriage.”260 Moreover,
there is presumed parentage for a stepparent who marries the “woman
who gave birth” after the birth if the stepparent “asserted parentage of
the child” on an official record.261 Finally, if a nonparent lived “with
the child for the first two years of the life of the child . . . and openly held
out the child” as one’s own, the nonparent is presumed to be the child’s
parent, even if this nonparent was never married to the legal parent.262
Implicit in this last presumption is the nonparent’s affirmative assertion
that the nonparent will support the child, even though there may be no
biological ties. These parental presumptions may be rebutted.263
The 2017 UPA departs significantly from earlier UPAs by expressly
recognizing a de facto childcare parent.264 To establish standing as a
de facto parent, one must demonstrate, inter alia, residence with the
child “as a regular member of the child’s household for a significant
period”; “consistent caretaking of the child”; no expectation of financial
benefit arising from parentage; and a parental relationship with the
Once
child “fostered or supported” by “another parent.”265
recognized, de facto parents seemingly stand on equal footing with
other individuals—beyond birth mothers—when there are “competing
claims of . . . parentage.”266 Yet here, unlike presumed parentage which
may be initially sought by alleged presumed parents or others, only
alleged de facto parents can pursue judicial determinations of de facto
childcare parentage.267 So the opportunities for child support orders

260. Id. § 204(a)(1)(A).
261. Id. § 204(a)(1)(C).
262. Id. § 204(a)(2).
263. Id. § 204(b).
264. Id. § 609(c) (discussing the rules related to standing of de facto parentage).
265. Id. § 609(d)(1)–(6).
266. These competing claims are to be adjudicated pursuant to the best interests of
the child, id. § 613(a), with a possible determination of only “two parents,” id. § 613(c)
alternative A, or “more than two parents,” id. § 613(c) alternative B.
267. See id. § 602(1)–(5). Birth mother, alleged presumed parent, child-support
agency, child, and alleged genetic parent can each sue to determine presumed
parentage. Id. Determination of de facto parentage “commenced only by an
individual who . . . claims to be a de facto parent.” Id. § 609(a). But see id. § 203
(stating that parentage under the act “applies for all purposes, except as otherwise
provided by law of this state other than this [act]”).
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against presumed and de facto parents vary greatly, and, in our view,
unreasonably.268 Why should one residing with and holding out a child
for two years be suable for child support, whereas one who developed
a “parental” relationship over a much longer period cannot be sued?
VI.

NONPARENT CHILD SUPPORT: CURRENT LAWS,
MODELS AND PRINCIPLES

Often stepparents, grandparents, or others can be recognized as de
facto parents by courts. Where such possible parents remain nonparents
under law, as noted earlier, they can still have childcare opportunities.269
Additionally, third parties who were never eligible for de facto parentage
can also have childcare opportunities.270 When such opportunities are
seized, of course these caretakers must provide support for the children
while in their care. Usually, however, there are no additional child
support duties, like payments to established legal parents for additional
child support, which attach to nonparent childcare orders.271 Child
support payments may be ordered to be paid by a noncustodial parent to a
nonparent who is caring for the parent’s child.272
While not customary, child support might be ordered to be paid
directly to a legal parent by a nonparent who secures a childcare order.
A nonparent eligible for, but without, de facto childcare parent status
is often more likely susceptible to a support order over objections than
is a nonparent never eligible for de facto childcare parent status.273 De
facto childcare parentage norms, as earlier noted, more frequently
include direct and indirect (i.e., acts in a parental-like way) requisites
on earlier financial contributions to child welfare.274

268. Once established, both presumed and de facto parentage apply for “all
purposes” unless otherwise provided. See id. § 203.
269. See infra Part VII (explaining, for example, that the NCCUSL recognizes a nonparent, under certain criteria, as a de facto or presumed parent).
270. See, e.g., NONPARENTAL CHILD CUSTODY & VISITATION ACT § 112 (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N, Draft for Discussion, 2017) (explaining that a court can grant custody to a
nonparent if the nonparent acted as consistent caretaker and has substantial
relationship with the child).
271. But see N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09 (2009) (noting that child support continues for
stepparent after marriage dissolution if stepchild remains “in the stepparent’s family”).
272. See, e.g., Burak v. Burak, 150 A.3d 360, 385 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (finding
that divorcing parents may be ordered to pay support to grandparents who secured
custody), rev’d, 168 A.3d 883 (Md. 2017).
273. See supra note 116.
274. See supra note 111.
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Objections to court-ordered child support are far less available to
nonparents who agreed to assume support duties along with the legal
parents. Such pacts may have prompted legal parents to withdraw their
objections, or to fail to object, to court-ordered nonparent childcare orders.
Not all eligible stepparents, grandparents or other nonparents
(whether or not possible de facto parents) seize their childcare
opportunities. Their failure to do so does not preclude child support
orders directed at them. These orders are sometimes, but not always,
as with certain stepparents or grandparents, founded on
agreements.275 These support orders are distinct from any such orders
against those nonparents who were childcare parents at one time, but
whose childcare interests were terminated,276 or otherwise ended.277
They are also distinct from support orders against unwed biological
fathers whose sex with birth mothers prompted births, where the men
failed to ever qualify as childcare parents due to their failures to seize
their childcare opportunities in a timely fashion.278 Additionally, these
support orders are distinct from child support orders directed at
nonparents who never were or could be legal parents, and who never
were or could be eligible even for third-party childcare orders. Such
nonparent support orders might be founded on the nonparent
agreements to assume child support responsibilities.
In the following paragraphs we consider the models, principles and
current laws on nonparent child support. We examine separately
possible support from stepparents, grandparents, and other
nonparents. We do not address unwed biological fathers who never
became childcare parents to children born from sexual intercourse.
275. 2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 135, §§ 3.10, 3.13 (recommending adoption
of parental agreement terms for a child-support award).
276. See Ex parte M.D.C., 39 So. 3d 1117, 1132 (Ala. 2009) (concluding a father’s
obligation to pay child support was not extinguished under the Child Protection Act
when his parental rights were terminated).
277. Consider a situation in which a child support order against a man whose earlier
voluntary paternity acknowledgement (“VAP”) was effectively challenged and where
child support duties may continue despite lack of any childcare acts. See In re T.M.S.,
No. W2012-02220-COA-R3-JV, 2013 WL 3422975, at *5–6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 2013)
(failing to reach the issue regarding the effect of disestablished paternity per VAP
challenge as there was no evidence in the record of a VAP); see also Price v. Price, No.
W2012-01501-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 1701814, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2013)
(finding no VAP on record in the case).
278. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262, 265 (1983) (stating that American
states can deny federal constitutional childcare interests to an unwed biological father
with no “significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship” with his biological
child born of sex).
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Stepparent Child Support

Stepparents often meet every substantive requirement of a legal
parent, while not recognized as such. While this is not always the case,
in most instances states recognize the role of a stepparent on the same
grounds as a legal parent, and will therefore grant parental rights to
stepparents ranging from de facto parentage to visitation rights. The
variety of state laws on stepparent childcare and child support further
demonstrate the importance of uniform principles to guide application.
1.

Models and Principles
There are some model laws and proposed principles on the child
support duties of stepparents, either current or former, where there
are no accompanying stepparent childcare orders. NCCUSL’s 1983
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA) speaks to the possibility
that prospective spouses279 will agree on “personal rights and
obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a
criminal penalty.”280 NCCUSL’s 2012 Uniform Premarital and Marital
Agreements Act (UPMAA) covers agreements by prospective spouses,
as well as current spouses who “intend to remain married,” that are not
in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty.281
The UPMAA recognizes there can be contractual terms on “custodial
responsibility,”282 which certainly contemplates some level of child
support when childcare is undertaken upon judicial approval, which is
always needed although there is a contract.283 Additionally, the
UPMAA expressly recognizes that it supplements, and does not
displace, the “principles of law and equity”284 and that any pacts cannot
“adversely affect[] a child’s right to support.”285 The accompanying
comment to § 10 recognizes “a long-standing consensus that
premarital agreements . . . cannot limit the amount of child support
279. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983) (defining
“premarital agreement” as “an agreement between prospective spouses made in
contemplation of marriage”).
280. Id. § 3(8).
281. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 2(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2012).
282. Id. § 10(a). Though such terms are not “binding on the court.” Id. § 10(c).
283. See id. § 10(b) (describing criteria to be used when finding agreement is “not
enforceable”); id. § 10(a) (noting custodial responsibility pacts can involve “physical
or legal custody, parenting time, access, visitation, or other custodial right or duty with
respect to a child”).
284. Id. § 5.
285. Id. § 10(b)(1).
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(though an agreed increase of child support may be enforceable).”286 A
child is unlikely to be adversely impacted by increased support,
especially when a judicial review of any promised childcare occurs.
The 2012 UPMAA does not speak directly to contracts regarding
“personal rights and obligations” while the 1983 UPAA does address
contractual rights.287
NCCUSL’s 1970 Uniform (now Model) Marriage and Divorce Act
(MMDA) speaks to child support orders against “either or both parents
owing a duty of support.”288 It “does not set forth the conditions under
which a parent owes a duty of support to a child,” though it does
address the “[p]rinciples affecting duties of support.”289 While the
Act’s custody section recognizes “intervention” of interested parties
beyond parents, guardians, and custodians,290 it does not speak to
intervention or joinder of parties for child support determinations.291
As with premarital and midmarriage pacts, the MMDA is silent on
marriage dissolution pacts addressing stepparent child support.
By contrast the 2016 ALI Restatement draft recognizes “a narrow
exception” to the general rule that “only legal parents owe a duty of
economic support” to children.292 It declares that child support can be
imposed upon “a person other than a legal parent,”293 seemingly
including a present or former stepparent. Support follows from the
person’s conduct which equitably estops a denial of support
responsibility.294
The earlier 2000 ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolutions
spoke less narrowly. There, a parental support obligation of “a person
who may not be the child’s parent under state law” was recognized
286. Id. § 10 cmt.
287. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(8) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
288. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 309 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1970).
289. Id. § 309 cmt.
290. Id. § 401(e).
291. Id. § 309.
292. RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No.
2, 2016) § 2.1 cmt. h (stating that such nonparent support operates for persons whose
“conduct equitably estops them” (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 501(b) (1995)).
Where parents cannot “provide a minor child’s minimum needs, a stepparent or a
person who cohabits in the relationship of husband and wife with the parent” has a
support duty, but “only while the child makes residence with such stepparent or person
and the marriage or cohabitation continues”. DEL CODE ANN. Tit. 13, § 501(b); see also
2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 135, § 3.24 (describing duration of child-support
obligation).
293. RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 2.1 cmt. h.
294. Id.
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where prior affirmative conduct estops a denial of a support
obligation.295 Seemingly, this includes a stepparent, whether or not
ever eligible to seek childcare parentage. Here, estoppel extends to a
person who had “an explicit or implicit agreement,” or otherwise
undertook, “a parental support obligation to the child”;296 the child
was born during the person’s marriage to or cohabitation with the
child’s parent;297 or the person and the child’s parent agreed to
conceive a child and, as parents, to “share responsibility for raising the
child.”298
As noted, NCCUSL holds that a nonparent meeting certain criteria
can be a presumed or de facto parent, each a legal parent.299
Addressing only those who are nonparents, in 2017, NCCUSL
completed a draft of a new model law, the Nonparent Child Custody
and Visitation Act (NPCCVA).300 This act addresses nonparental
childcare interests, including stepparent interests.
Within its
definition, a nonparent expressly includes “an individual other than a
parent.”301 Throughout the act, the relationship between the nonparent
and the child is measured and balanced against the interests of parents. Via
the draft and its comments, the NCCUSL has identified certain
distinguishing principles for determining whether a “substantial
relationship”302 rises to the level that a court should have discretion to
grant nonparent childcare over parental objections. One such
principle specifies that while a person with a relationship solely with
the parent will not be considered,303 the NPCCVA stresses the
importance of relationships with children over biological ties.304 An
295. See 2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 135, § 3.03(1).
296. Id. § 3.03(1)(a).
297. Id. § 3.03(1)(b).
298. Id. § 3.03(1)(c).
299. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
300. NONPARENTAL CHILD CUSTODY & VISITATION ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAW, Draft for Discussion, 2017).
301. Id. § 102(10).
302. Id. § 102(18) (defining “substantial relationship” as a “familial or other
relationship in which a significant emotional bond exists between a nonparent and a
child”).
303. See id. § 106(a)(2) (requiring a substantial relationship with a child to have
standing to file for custody or visitation). This would remove any boyfriend, girlfriend,
spouse, or other partner of the parent who makes no effort to act as a caretaker for
the child.
304. Id. § 106(a)(1)–(2). Standing to pursue custody or visitation is based on the
nonparent’s relationship with the child; biology is not mentioned, even when a
nonparent seeks visitation or custody.
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actual beneficial relationship is integral,305 as are the best interests of
the child.306 While the NPCCVA chiefly focuses on childcare by way of
custody or visitation, it speaks at least indirectly to child support. Thus,
nonparent childcare orders necessarily involve some nonparent child
support duties. As to whether nonparents may be ordered to pay
support beyond that provided during childcare, even where there is
nonparental childcare, NPCCVA is silent.
2.

Current Laws
Given these models and principles on nonparent child support by
stepparents, we now consider current stepparent child support laws.
We explore, separately, support orders based on premarital,
midmarriage, and marriage dissolution agreements, on other
agreements, and on circumstances involving no agreements.
a. Premarital, Midmarriage, and Marriage Dissolution Child Support
Agreements
Stepparents may be subject to child support orders tied to earlier
formal premarital, midmarriage, or marriage dissolution agreements.
Stepparents herein include the future, current, or former spouses of
childcare parents who cannot be potential or actual de facto parents,
as where children already have two biological or adoptive childcare
parents in states that foreclose more than two childcare parents at any
one time. The factual context for these agreements will often differ. For
example, only marriage dissolution agreements can be easily
incorporated into court judgments, making their enforcement available
through contempt proceedings.307 Premarital agreements, by contrast,
are typically undertaken during happy times, when people look forward
to marital bliss, while midmarriage agreements often are undertaken to
save failing marriages. These distinctions should inform state laws, which
should also be guided by the previously noted NCCUSL model laws,
including the 1983 UPAA, the 2012 UPMAA, and the 1970 MMDA.
Statutes and common law precedents on stepparent child support
arising from formal premarriage or midmarriage contracts seem quite
scarce. More common, perhaps, are stepparent child support pledges
305. See id. § 107 (considering factors such as the length of physical residence of
nonparent and child, regularity of contact, willingness of caretaking, and other
parental acceptance of nonparent caretaking).
306. Id. § 112(a)(1)(c), (a)(2) (directing that courts should consider if granting
custody or visitation “is in the best interest of the child”).
307. See Lester v. Lester, 658 P.2d 915, 915 (Idaho 1983).
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incorporated into marriage dissolution decrees.308 Here, even without
explicit statutory obligation, stepparents sometimes voluntarily assume
continuing stepchild support duties. Such support is more likely
assumed where legal parents agree to continuing childcare
opportunities for (soon-to-be former) stepparents who otherwise have
no standing to seek court-ordered childcare.309
b. Other Child Support Agreements
Stepparents often are not potential or actual de facto parents. Yet
these stepparents may nevertheless be subject to child support orders
over their objections where support is tied to earlier, informal
agreements that are not governed by any state laws on formal
premarital, midmarriage, or marriage dissolution pacts. Consider, for
example, a future spouse who pledges orally that any of the
stepchildren in the marriage who attend parochial schools will have
their educational expenses paid by the stepparent from his or her
assets. Comparably, during an ongoing marriage, especially at a time
when marriage dissolution is seriously contemplated, a stepparent may
make oral promises on matters like assumption of expenses for a
stepchild’s summer camp (perhaps to allow the married couple more
time to work out their differences).
Again, as with formal stepparent child support contracts, statutes on
informal premarital or midmarriage pledges of stepparent child
support are scarce. Yet there are precedents recognizing that informal,
even implicit, pledges by stepparents during marriage to support their
spouses’ children (perhaps indefinitely) can lead to stepparent child
support orders entered during marriage dissolution proceedings.310
Here the doctrine of equitable estoppel is sometimes employed to
deny a stepparent the opportunity to challenge a child support request

308. See 2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 135, § 3.03 cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 2000)
(“[S]tate law and these Principles impose no continuing duty of child support on a
stepparent.”).
309. John C. Mayoue, Stepping in to Parent: The Legal Rights of Stepparents, FAM.
ADVOC., Fall 2002, at 36, 38–39 (citing Weinard v. Weinard, 616 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Neb.
2000)) (discussing a case where a stepfather continued voluntarily child support
contributions in conjunction with continued visitation after separation from the
child’s mother).
310. See Deborah H. Bell, Child Support Orders: The Common Law Framework—Part II,
69 MISS. L.J. 1063, 1073 (2000) (explaining support duties have been imposed on
stepparents “on the basis of implied or express contract”).
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by an established legal parent soon to be, or now, an ex-spouse, where the
stepparent earlier pledged to provide continuing stepchild support.311
c.

Child Support Orders With No Child Support Agreements

Stepparents often are not potential or actual de facto parents. Yet
these nonparent stepparents may nevertheless be subject to child
support orders untethered to any earlier formal or informal
agreements. As noted earlier, the 2016 ALI Restatement draft
recognizes such possible orders could be founded on equitable
estoppel grounds which need not always involve earlier support
promises.312 The earlier 2000 ALI Principles elaborated on such
estoppel, indicating it may be founded not only on an undertaking of
a child support obligation,313 but also on cohabitation with a child’s
parent when the child is born.314
Here, unlike child support agreements, state lawmakers have
discussed stepparent child support without earlier agreements. Some
states reject stepchild support obligations during marriage.315 Other
states categorically end any support obligations of a stepparent upon
dissolution of the marriage to the child’s legal parent.316 For instance,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated, “New Jersey has no statutory
requirement imposing a duty of support on a stepparent for his or her
spouse’s children by a former marriage. Nor did the common law
impose a legal obligation on a stepparent to support the children of
311. 2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 135, § 3.03(1) (noting that a court may in
estop a nonparent from denying a “parental support obligation” if there was prior
affirmative conduct, including “an explicit or implicit agreement”).
312. See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 2.1 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST.,
Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2016).
313. See 2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 135, § 3.03(1)(a) (explaining that estoppel
may arise when a nonparent assumes a parental support obligation to the child).
314. See id. § 3.03(1)(b). As to marriage, any estoppel would seemingly yield to the
prevailing marital parentage presumption. As to cohabitation at the time of birth of
one later a stepparent, we find that generally applications of an estoppel doctrine
untethered to any agreement would be unfair.
315. See, e.g., Klipstein v. Zalewski, 553 A.2d 1384, 1387–88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1988) (stating that in the absence of equitable estoppel, a stepparent has no duty to
support a stepchild).
316. See, e.g., Ruben v. Ruben, 461 A.2d 733, 735 (N.H. 1983) (“At common law
there was no obligation to support a stepchild, and only recently has such an obligation
been imposed by statute in a few jurisdictions. The majority of those jurisdictions
imposing an obligation . . . have held that . . . once the marriage is dissolved the
stepparent relationship ceases and with it the obligation to support the stepchild.”
(citations omitted)).
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his or her spouse by another party.”317 In Nebraska, a person’s failure
to provide for a “dependent stepchild is a Class I misdemeanor,”318
seemingly excluding failures as to former stepchildren. In the District
of Columbia, “[a] stepparent is not required . . . to support his or her
stepchildren,” but is legally responsible for spousal support.319 In Iowa,
courts have ordered temporary child support from a stepparent to a
stepchild while the trial court determined whether an equitable
adoption had occurred, even though Iowa courts are statutorily
proscribed from ordering support from former stepparents on a
permanent basis.320 And in Tennessee, there is no postdivorce child
support obligation of a former stepparent even if the stepparent earlier
sought termination of a legal parent’s childcare rights in contemplation
of an adoption which never occurred.321
In South Dakota, “[a] stepparent shall maintain his spouse’s
children born prior to their marriage and is responsible as a parent for
their support and education suitable to his circumstances.”322 But,
“[e]ven one who accepts the responsibility for a child as in loco parentis
cannot be required to furnish support for the child subsequent to the
dissolution of the marriage.”323 In New Hampshire, “absent a valid
adoption, a stepparent’s duty to support a stepchild . . . ceases because

317. Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 355 (N.J. 1984).
318. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-705(5) (2008).
319. D.C. CODE § 4-205.22(a) (2001); see also Long v. Creighton, 670 N.W.2d 621,
628 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“No case law or statute imposes a legal duty upon a new
spouse to provide support for his or her step-children.”). But see § 4-205.22(b)(1)
(requiring that the stepparent’s income be considered when determining public
assistance eligibility for a child who lives with a parent and stepparent).
320. Cf. Whitlock v. Dist. Court of Fayette Cty., 497 N.W.2d 891, 894–95 (Iowa 1993)
(stressing that the ruling was solely temporary and investigatory and that such orders
are ones “of necessity,” which are “based on preliminary information that may or may
not be substantiated on further hearing”).
321. Compare Braun v. Braun, No. E2012-00823-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 4563551,
at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2012) (declaring that in Tennessee only natural parents
or parents by adoption may be required to pay child support), with Frye v. Frye, 738
P.2d 505, 506 (Nev. 1987) (per curiam) (finding where there is a promise to adopt,
the court may apply equitable adoption, and require child support as the remedy).
322. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-8 (2013).
323. E.H. v. M.H., 512 N.W.2d 148, 149–51 (S.D. 1994) (rejecting any child support
based on the relationship between the stepfather and stepchildren since granting
support on this basis would discourage “stepparents from establishing close and loving
relationships with the stepchildren, and, in a sense, reward the stereotypical wicked
stepparent for refusing to show love and support for them during the marriage”
(citation omitted)).
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the stepparent relationship ceases upon dissolution of the marriage.”324
In Washington, while the “expenses” of current stepchildren are
chargeable upon the property of either spouses, or both domestic
partners, or either of them, and they may be sued jointly or separately,
“[t]he obligation to support stepchildren shall cease upon the entry of
a decree of dissolution, decree of legal separation, or death.”325
Elsewhere, stepchild support obligations only arise during marriage
under certain circumstances, such as living in the same residence. In
North Dakota, stepparents are “not bound to maintain the spouse’s
dependent children . . . unless the child is received into the
stepparent’s family.”326 In Missouri, “[a] stepparent shall support his
or her stepchild to the same extent that a natural or adoptive parent is
required to support his or her child, so long as the stepchild is living
in the same home as the stepparent.”327
For some current stepparents, child support is dependent upon a
lack of financial resources available to the legal parents. In Vermont,
stepparents have a duty to support stepchildren if they reside in the
same household and if the financial resources of the parents are
“insufficient to provide the child with a reasonable subsistence.”328 In
Hawaii, “[a] stepparent who acts in loco parentis” is bound to support
the child “during the residence of the child with the stepparent,” but
only “if the legal parents desert the child or are unable to support the
child, thereby reducing the child to destitute and necessitous
circumstances.”329 In Kentucky, child support arises for a “stepparent
of any child who is an applicant or recipient of public assistance.”330 In
New York, stepparents of “sufficient ability” are responsible for the
support of a child under twenty-one who, inter alia, is “a recipient of

324. See Ruben v. Ruben, 461 A.2d 733, 735 (N.H. 1983) (citing N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 546-A:1 to 546-A:12).
325. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.205 (West 2016) (explaining that petitions for
marriage dissolution or legal separation, once filed, can prompt the termination of
the obligation of a stepparent to support a stepchild; dissolution decrees involving
marriage or legal separation or death ends the stepchild support obligation);
cf. OR. REV. STAT. § 108.045 (2007) (paralleling Washington’s statute).
326. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09 (2009) (requiring that support continues “during
the marriage” and thereafter if the stepchild remains “in the stepparent’s family”).
327. MO. REV. STAT. § 453.400(1) (2016); see also id. § 453.400(4) (clarifying that the
statute does not grant a stepparent “any right to the care and custody of a stepchild”).
328. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 296 (2010) (explaining that this duty lasts as long
as the relevant “marital bond . . . shall continue”).
329. HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-4 (2016).
330. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.310 (West 2006).
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public assistance or care . . . or . . . in an institution in the department
of mental hygiene.”331
As for former stepparents, there are few laws on child support orders
against objecting former stepparents who undertook no agreements,
pledges or the like. In North Dakota, once a stepparent “receives”
their spouse’s dependent children into their family, the stepparent is
liable to support the children both during the marriage and after its
termination if the children remain part of the stepparent’s family.332
B.

Grandparent Child Support

It is rare to find state laws that explicitly reference financial obligations
of a grandparent for a grandchild, but grandparent support does
sometimes arise. Current laws requiring some, including grandparents,
to provide child support, as well as the model laws, are careful to specify
both equity and estoppel interests when grandparent support is at issue.
1.

Models and Principles
Model laws and proposed principles generally do not speak directly
to grandparent child support duties. The 1983 UPAA does not address
the parties who may execute premarital agreements beyond “prospective
spouses.”333 In such agreements, “any” matter not specifically addressed
in the UPAA may be added, “including . . . personal rights and
obligations,” as long as it is “not in violation of public policy or a statute
imposing a criminal penalty.”334 As to what matters may be specifically
addressed, a comment indicates that the references “are intended to
be illustrative, not exclusive.”335 For us, the 1983 UPAA presents no
barrier to those beyond “prospective spouses,” including
grandparents, becoming parties to an otherwise valid premarital
agreement, though the requisites for contract validity under the 1983
UPAA would likely not apply, or would apply differently.336

331. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 415 (McKinney 2017); see also Eckhardt v. Eckhardt, 323
N.Y.S.2d 611, 611 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971) (stating the duty to support a stepchild ends
upon divorce).
332. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09 (2009).
333. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
334. See id. § 3(a)(8).
335. See id. § 3 cmt.
336. For example, the 1983 UPAA allows an agreement to be “enforceable without
consideration.” Id. § 2. And it only allows an agreement to be “effective upon
marriage,” and tolls “[a]ny statute of limitations” applicable to the signing spouses
during their marriage. See id. §§ 4, 8.
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The 2012 UPMAA likewise fails to directly address nonspousal
parties to any contract. It expressly covers only premarital pacts
between “individuals who intend to marry” and marital pacts “between
spouses who intend to remain married.”337 But here too, there is no
express barrier to pacts involving promises by others, including
grandparents, who pledge grandchild support. And the Act expressly
recognizes such pacts can address “custody, . . . access, [or]
visitation . . . with respect to a child.”338
The 1974 Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), later
amended and retitled in 1996 as the Model Marriage and Divorce Act,
expressly applies only to settlements of “disputes that have arisen
between parties to a marriage.”339 Yet the UMDA recognizes that in a
marriage dissolution or legal separation proceeding, a court “may join
additional parties proper for the exercise of its authority to implement”
the relevant statutes.340 As to child support orders, the UMDA speaks only
to orders against “either or both parents owing a duty of support.”341
Again, grandparent support promises are not explicitly barred.
By contrast, the 2016 ALI Restatement draft recognizes a “few
narrow exceptions” to the general rule that “only legal parents owe the
duty of economic support” to children.342 In its earlier Principles of
the Law of Family Dissolution in 2000, the ALI exceptions were not as
narrow. There, the ALI spoke to a “parental support obligation” of “a
person who may not be the child’s parent under state law” where prior
affirmative conduct estops a denial of the obligation.343 Estoppel
included instances where a person had “an explicit or implicit
337. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 2(2), (5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2012).
338. See id. § 10(a).
339. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 102(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1970).
340. See id. § 303(b), (f). Such joinder, for example, seemingly is needed when a
court order is sought “restraining any person from transferring, encumbering,
concealing, or otherwise disposing of any property except in the usual course of
business or for the necessities of life.” See id. § 304(b)(1).
341. Id. § 309.
342. See RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 2.1 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST.,
Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2016). The accompanying Reporter’s note to Comment (h)
says such nonparent support operates for persons whose “conduct equitably estops
them.” Id. § 2.1 cmt. h (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 501(b) (1995)) (stating that
where parents cannot “provide a minor child’s minimum needs, a stepparent or a
person who cohabits in the relationship of husband and wife with the parent” has a
support duty, but “only while the child makes residence with such stepparent or person
and the marriage or cohabitation continues”).
343. 2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 135, § 3.03(1).
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agreement” or otherwise undertook an assumption of “a parental
support obligation to the child”;344 the child was born during the
person’s marriage to or cohabitation with the child’s parent;345 or the
person and the child’s parent agreed to conceive the child and to
undertake as parents shared responsibility for the child.346 We find
that in limited settings, a grandparent could be responsible, per the
2000 Principles, for a “parental support obligation,” encompassing
circumstances where the grandparent was or was not ever eligible to
be deemed a childcare parent.347
2.

Current Laws
With these models and principles on nonparent child support by
grandparents in mind, we now look to the current laws on courtordered grandchild support, where the obliged grandparent has not
been deemed a childcare parent. We explore separately orders based
on premarital, midmarriage, and marriage dissolution agreements,
other agreements, and circumstances involving no agreements.
a. Premarital, Midmarriage, and Marriage Dissolution Child Support
Agreements
Grandparents, herein the parents of children who are now, or were
once, or were or are now eligible to be, legal parents may not
themselves be potential or actual de facto parents. Yet these nonparent
grandparents could nevertheless be subject to grandchild support
orders tied to earlier promises within premarital, midmarriage, or
marriage dissolution agreements. We find no current laws specifically
addressing grandparent agreements on grandchild support.
Generally, premarital and mid-marriage pacts should operate under
comparable standards, which are at times (especially in the premarital
setting) guided by the 1983 UPAA, if not the 2012 UPMAA. Generally,
marriage dissolution pacts operate under different standards, often
derived from the 1970 UMDA.348 Within these model laws, we glean
little direct support for enforcing grandparent child support
344. Id. § 3.03(1)(a).
345. Id. § 3.03(1)(b).
346. Id. § 3.03(1)(c).
347. See id. § 3.03 (noting that agreeing or undertaking the obligation, cohabitating
with the grandchild, or agreeing to share responsibility would make a grandparent
liable for a parental support obligation).
348. See generally UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT §§ 301–316 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1970) (discussing marriage dissolution generally).
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agreements. Thus, the 2012 UPMAA speaks to premarital and
midmarriage agreements “between spouses” or between “those who
are about to become spouses.”349 Yet it also recognizes that its
provisions are supplemented by “principles of law and equity” outside
of the UPMAA.350 We posit that law and equity would support
enforcement of at least some grandchild support promises, such as
pledges to pay for college tuition or piano lessons.
b. Other Child Support Agreements
Grandparents often are not potential or actual de facto parents. Yet
such grandparents might nevertheless be subject to child support
orders tied to earlier agreements that are not within premarital,
midmarriage, or marriage dissolution pacts. The 1973 UPA, for
example, recognized the enforceability of a written promise to furnish
child support “growing out of a supposed or alleged father and child
relationship,” where consideration was not required.351 For us,
grandparents whose sons had children born out of wedlock should
often be responsible for their grandchild support promises, including
those made in the hope of securing greater (or at least some)
grandparent-grandchild interactions, as when birth mothers maintain
exclusive, or primary, child custody.
c.

Child Support Orders With No Child Support Agreements

Nonparent grandparents may also be subject to child support orders
untethered to any earlier agreements. Current grandparents may be
liable to provide support for grandchildren when the custodial parents
lack the means to provide for the children or when parents are minors.
For example, Louisiana requires grandparents “to provide for their
needy descendants . . . limited to the basic necessities of food, clothing,
shelter, and health care.”352 However, such orders should be “used
sparingly and as a last resort; and only when attempts at parental

349. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2012).
350. Id. § 5.
351. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 22(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
352. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 237 (2016); see also Landeche v. Airhart, 372 So. 2d 598,
599–600 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that “[Louisiana] courts have recognized that the
duty of a grandparent under Civil Code Article [237] extends only to needy
descendants,” which include grandchildren whose parents still provide support).
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support have been exhausted.”353 Wisconsin similarly requires
grandparents to provide support for grandchildren when the
grandchild’s parent is a “dependent person under the age of
[eighteen].”354 In New Jersey, “in the absence of a statute,” unless the
grandparent acts in loco parentis the grandparent “cannot be
compelled to support the offspring of his unemancipated child”;
however, a grandparent can be required to supplement child support
when the grandparent directly limits the unemancipated child from
raising income which could be paid toward child support.355 In
Connecticut, a court may order a “relative or relatives to contribute
to . . . support” for a child who is a ward of the state.356 Applications of
these and similar statutes to former grandparents present challenging
questions, as do applications to great-grandparents, whether current
or former. Ultimately, the existence of childcare opportunities to
grandparents cannot, by itself, prompt grandparents to pay grandchild
support directly to the legal parents.
C.

Other Nonparent Child Support

Similar to grandparents, state laws and models generally do not
explicitly address child support duties of nonparents and only
reference family or marital relationships. However, the recent 2016
ALI Restatement drafts contain some exceptions that may provide for
the possibility that nonparents, beyond grandparents and stepparents,
pay child support through equitable estoppel.

353. See Banquer v. Banquer, 554 So. 2d 790, 792–93 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (requiring
alimentary support when (1) children are sufficiently needy and (2) any grandparent
has the financial ability to pay the support).
354. WIS. STAT. § 49.90(1)(a)(2) (2015); cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. 50-13.4(b) (2016)
(“[P]arents of a minor, unemancipated child who is the custodial or noncustodial
parent of a child shall share . . . [with the child’s parents] primary liability for their
grandchild’s support with . . . the court determining the proper share, until the minor
parent reaches the age of [eighteen] or becomes emancipated.”).
355. A.N. ex rel. S.N. v. S.M., 756 A.2d 625, 628 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)
(explaining that the grandfather had prohibited his son to work, thereby reducing the
income the son had to pay child support). Since the grandfather had limited the
“potential earnings,” he would have to pay that difference between actual and
potential income. See id. at 641 (“The potential earning capacity of an individual, not
his or her actual income, should be considered when determining the amount a
supporting party must pay.”(quoting Halliwell v. Halliwell, 741 A.2d 638, 641 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999))).
356. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-215(8)(B) (2015).
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1.

Models and Principles
Model laws and proposed principles generally do not speak to the
child support duties of nonparents beyond stepparents and
grandparents. As noted, the 1983 UPAA does not address the parties
who may execute premarital agreements, where the agreements can
address “personal rights and obligations,” beyond “prospective
spouses.”357 For us, the 1983 UPAA presents no barrier to nonparents,
like aunts or siblings, committing to child support via premarital
agreements, though the contract requisites under the 1983 UPAA may
not be fully applicable, or apply differently.358
The 2012 UPMAA likewise fails to address directly nonspousal
parties, as it expressly covers only premarital pacts between
“individuals who intend to marry” and marital pacts “between spouses
who intend to remain married.”359 Again, we find no bar to inclusion
of nonparent child support promises.
The 1970 UMDA expressly applies only to settlements of “disputes that
have arisen between parties to a marriage.”360 Yet it recognizes that in a
marriage dissolution or legal separation proceeding, a court “may join
additional parties proper for the exercise of its authority to implement”
the relevant statutes.361 As to child support orders, the UMDA speaks only
to orders against “either or both parents owing a duty of support.”362
Here again, pledges of nonparent support might be added to
contracts,363 where no consideration may be necessary for enforcement.

357. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(8) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983) (stating
that parties may contract for nearly any premarital matter as long as the personal rights
and obligations do not undermine “public policy,” including a “statute imposing a
criminal penalty”).
358. For example, the 1983 UPAA allows an agreement to be “enforceable without
consideration,” to be “effective upon marriage,” and to toll “any statute of limitations”
applicable to the signing spouses during their marriage. Id. §§ 2, 4, 8. A nonparent,
non-spouse agreement to support may not be dependent upon a later marriage if it is
severable.
359. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 2(2), (5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2012).
360. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 102(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1970).
361. See id. § 303(b), (f). Such joinder, for example, seemingly is needed when a
court order is sought “restraining any person from transferring, encumbering,
concealing, or otherwise disposing of any property except in the usual course of
business or for the necessities of life.” Id. § 304(b)(1).
362. Id. § 309.
363. See id. (setting forth the factors which the court should consider when
determining the amount of support to be paid).
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By contrast, the 2016 ALI Restatement draft recognizes a “few
narrow exceptions” to the general rule that “only legal parents owe the
duty of economic support” to children.364 Within the ALI’s 2000
Principles, these exceptions were not as narrow as they became in the
2016 ALI Restatement draft. In 2000, the ALI spoke to a “parental
support obligation” of “a person who may not be the child’s parent
under state law” where prior affirmative conduct estops a denial of the
obligation.365 Estoppel included a nonparent who had “an explicit or
implicit agreement” on, or who otherwise undertook, “a parental
support obligation to the child.”366 For us, estoppel could apply to
aunts, siblings, and others (beyond stepparents and grandparents)
who agreed to provide child support, be it via regular payments or a
creation of a college expense fund.
2.

Current laws
Given these models and principles on nonparent child support
extending beyond stepparents and grandparents, we now consider the
current laws on such support. We explore separately orders based on
premarital, midmarriage, and marriage dissolution agreements, other
agreements, and circumstances involving no agreements.
a. Premarital, Midmarriage, and Marriage Dissolution Child Support
Agreements
Beyond stepparents and grandparents, other relatives and some
nonrelatives are potential, or are then actual, de facto parents. When
these nonparents have not attained, or are not eligible for, de facto
parentage, they may nevertheless be subject to child support orders
tied to their earlier agreements in premarital, midmarriage, or
marriage dissolution pacts.

364. RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 2.1 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST.,
Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2016). The accompanying Reporter’s Note to Comment (h)
says such nonparent support operates for persons whose “conduct equitably estops
them.” Id. § 2.1 cmt. h, note.
365. See 2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 135, § 3.03(1).
366. See id. § 3.03(1)(a). Estoppel conceivably could prompt child support under
the Principles for nonparents, beyond stepparents and grandparents, including aunts,
uncles or siblings who cohabited with the child’s parent when the birth occurred, or
agreed to “share responsibility for raising the child” conceived as a result of an
agreement wherein nonparent would be “a parent to the child.” Id. § 3.03(1)(b)–(c).

2018] DE FACTO PARENT & NONPARENT CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS

833

b. Other Child Support Agreements
Nonparents, beyond stepparents and grandparents, may also be
subject to child support orders tied to earlier agreements outside of
premarital, midmarriage, and marriage dissolution pacts.
For
example, in Illinois there are common laws claims against some
nonparents for child support for children born of assisted human
reproduction on theories of oral contract or promissory estoppel.367
c.

Child Support Orders With No Child Support Agreements

Nonparents beyond stepparents and grandparents are infrequently
subject to child support orders untethered to any earlier agreements.
Under common law in Kentucky, nonparents do not have a legal duty
to support or care for their domestic partner’s children, except when
they stand in loco parentis.368 In Pennsylvania, the high court refused
to expand the definition of one liable for child support to a sperm
donor who was personally known to the birth mother and her family,
based on the fact that the sperm donor and mother “agreed to an
arrangement that to all appearances was to resemble . . . a singleparent arrangement effectuated through the use of donor sperm
secured from a sperm bank.”369
Yet there are some nonparents who can be child support obligors in
the absence of agreements beyond nonparents standing in loco
parentis such as in Kentucky. For example, in West Virginia a trial
court can continue a one-time parent’s child support obligation even
though parental childcare rights were ended due to abuse or
neglect.370 Comparably in Alabama, child support continues for a
parent whose childcare interests were ended under the Child

367. See In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ill. 2003) (holding that the Illinois
Parentage Act does not preclude claims based on oral contract or promissory estoppel).
Such claims have not yet been extended to births resulting from sex. See Dep’t of Healthcare
& Family Servs. v. Arevalo, 68 N.E.3d 552, 560–61 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). Elsewhere, there are
seemingly no such common law claims. Bowden v. Korslin (In re Placement of A.M.K.), No.
2011AP2660, 2013 WL 4746428, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2013) (failing to indicate
how child was conceived during “committed” lesbian relationship).
368. Staples v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.3d 803, 813 (Ky. 2014).
369. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1248 (Pa. 2007) (analogizing the
relationship to a clinical, anonymous sperm donation since both parties fully intended
the mother to be sole parent). The dissent criticized this distinction, stating,
“Referring to Joel McKiernan as ‘Sperm Donor’ does not change his status—he is their
father.” Id. at 1249 (Eakin, J., dissenting).
370. See In re Stephen Tyler R., 584 S.E.2d 581, 581, 600 (W. Va. 2003).
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Protection Act.371 In Michigan, child support can continue, in the
absence of an adoption, for a parent who voluntarily ended his or her
parental rights.372 These obligations to provide child support without
parental rights to childcare stem from the principle that society should
not be called upon to support a child when parents have the financial
means to do so, which extends to nonparents or former parents in
these cases. This anomaly of child support responsibilities absent
childcare rights is further evidence of the need for clarification on the
rights of de facto and nonparents in child support inquiries.
VII.

NEW CHILD SUPPORT DUTIES FOR DE FACTO PARENTS
AND NONPARENTS?

As evidenced by our review of current childcare laws, the evolution
of the NCCUSL’s UPAs, NCCUSL’s 2017 NPCCVA proposal, and the
2000 ALI Principles, there are increasing opportunities and calls for
de facto parent and nonparent court-ordered childcare, at times, over
the objections of established legal parents. To date, scant attention
has been paid to any child support duties for these actual or potential
child caretakers, whether or not they did or might pursue via courtorder, or just continue or pursue or discontinue childcare without
court sanction. Further, little attention has been directed to possible
child support from nonparents (beyond unwed biological fathers who
failed to grasp childcare parentage) who never had childcare
opportunities. Such possible duties require exploration.
The challenges for American state lawmakers are well illustrated by
the Johnson case, wherein Madonna was awarded $500 a month which
was intended to be child support for Jessica, whom Antonyio was
deemed to have equitably adopted under North Dakota law due to his
(parental-like) actions toward Jessica in Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Florida and/or Kentucky.373 The North Dakota Supreme court applied
North Dakota child support guidelines though Jessica never lived
371. See Ex parte M.D.C., 39 So. 3d 1117, 1133 (Ala. 2009) (“To hold otherwise would
reward the most egregious cases of parental abuse and neglect by that parent’s not
having the burden of paying child support.”).
372. See Evink v. Evink, 542 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); see also State v.
Fritz, 801 A.2d 679, 685 (R.I. 2002) (stating that parents should not be able to avoid
child support obligations by voluntarily terminating parental rights). But see State
Dep’t of Human Servs. ex rel. Overstreet v. Overstreet, 78 P.3d 951, 954 n.3 (Okla.
2003) (concluding that child support obligations continue after parental rights have
been terminated).
373. See Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d at 113, 116 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
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there.374 The support order covered Jessica’s needs from the start of
the first trial, April 1999; was founded on Antonyio’s equitable
adoption parentage; and was necessary because of Madonna’s need for
child support for Jessica, who Madonna was raising in Kentucky,
perhaps along with Jessica’s natural parents (whose parental rights
seemingly had never been terminated).375
In considering how to address a Johnson or a similar case scenario
in their own state, American state lawmakers will need to examine, at
a minimum, the following questions on child support.376 First, is child
support ever available from an eligible de facto parent who never seeks
a childcare order, when there is no indication that the child has a great
need for additional support or will ever be dependent upon public
assistance should such support not be available?377 Recall that the 2017
UPA only allows an alleged de facto parent to seek de facto parent
status, meaning neither a Madonna nor a Jessica could sue Antonyio
for support under 2017 UPA if Antonyio did not seek such status. Yet
the 2017 UPA does allow a birth mother, the state, a child, and others
to seek to establish “presumed” parentage, which, once established,
operates for all legal purposes.378 Antonyio was not a presumed parent
under the 2017 UPA, as Madonna did not bear Jessica and Antonyio
did not reside with Jessica from the time of her birth.379 We see no
reason to distinguish between those who, while establishing parentallike relationships with children, do or do not hold out children as their
own for the first two years.
Second, if child support is available, which state’s or states’ child
support guidelines should be utilized when the acts prompting de facto
parentage, the de facto parent’s current residence, and the child’s
current residence are all situated in different states? It may be that the
choice of law guidelines in the court adjudicating a child support
request may require differentiation between the choice of law on
374. See id. at 112.
375. See id. at 117.
376. Of course, such examinations will often be preceded by inquiries into
equitable adoption, or other de facto childcare parent, laws and into choice of law
principles guiding courts confronting such childcare parent issues when children and their
nonparental caretakers earlier resided in several different states (and/or nations).
377. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Ca. 2005) (consenting
to the creation of a child cannot create a temporary relation to be assumed and
disclaimed at will).
378. See 2017 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
379. See Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d at 106 (majority opinion) (finding the Uniform
Parentage Act did not apply to the circumstances in the case).
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establishing parentage, on recognizing a child support duty for the
particular form of established parentage, and on the possible levels or
types of support available.380 Recall that in Johnson I, the child support
calculation standard of North Dakota was used for a child living outside
of North Dakota, when the child supporter had equitably adopted the
child through acts occurring outside of North Dakota.
Third, where de facto parent child support—independent of any
support provided during childcare—is possible, should the support
guidelines be comparable to those applicable to natural, marital,
presumed, acknowledged, and/or formal adoptive parents? Thus, for
example, is a childcaring de facto parent comparable to a childcaring
natural parent? Is a nonchildcaring nonparent comparable to a
nonchildcaring natural parent? In Johnson I, seemingly it was easy to
compare Antonyio as a nonchildcaring de facto parent and as a
nonchildcaring natural parent for applying child support obligations.
Fourth, where de facto parent child support—independent of any
support provided during childcare—is possible, should the support
guidelines for all de facto parents be the same, or should, for example,
stepparents, grandparents, and/or live-in significant others be treated
differently, whether or not all are or could be de facto parents under
similar standards? Recall that de facto parent childcare norms differ,
e.g., for grandparents and stepparents in some American states.
Fifth, should the child support guidelines ever differentiate between
two or more subclasses of certain de facto parents, as between
grandparents with or without biological ties, as is done in at least some
nonparent grandparent childcare settings, or as between stepfathers
who are or are not biologically-tied? A natural father may only be able
to become a childcare parent via formal adoption or de facto
parentage. This situation arises where he has sired, via sex, a child with
an unmarried woman, then failed to assume parental responsibility for
his child promptly after birth. Additionally, he must thereafter
sufficiently have acted in parent-like ways with his natural child to
prompt de facto parentage. Of course, natural stepfathers typically
need not achieve de facto childcare parent status to trigger possible
child support since state laws generally recognize child support duties
for natural parents who have no childcare rights.381

380. See, e.g., Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 669 (recognizing the value in having two parents
rather than one).
381. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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Finally, American state lawmakers should consider whether
nonparents (i.e., not natural, adoptive, presumed, acknowledged or de
facto parents) should ever be responsible for court-ordered child
support paid to a childcare parent or to childcare parents. Where
available, should such support be possible only if the nonparents have
court-ordered childcare over parental objections? If the nonparents
agreed to support? If the nonparents were eligible for, but failed to
pursue, third-party childcare orders? Here, as with de facto parents,
laws might distinguish between classes of nonparents, like stepparents
and grandparents, as is now done in some state third-party childcare
laws, or even between classes of grandparents, like those who are and
who are not biologically tied.
Besides considering these questions, American state lawmakers will
need to reexamine child support precedents predating the surge in de
facto parent and nonparent childcare laws. Earlier cases often utilized
equitable estoppel principles.382
Certainly, older equitable estoppel cases, which recognized limited
child support duties for former stepparents with no biological or
formal ties who otherwise failed to satisfy precise parentage norms (as
with marital parentage presumptions or VAPs), must be reconsidered
in light of increasing imprecise parentage norms. For example, one
precedent required former stepparent child support be founded on
his or her “fraudulent activity” or “unusual hardship to the child if the
support obligation were not imposed.”383 Another permitted former
stepparent support only if “a stepparent by his or her conduct actively
interferes with the children’s support from their natural parent that
he or she may be equitably estopped from denying his or her duty to
support the children.”384 A third precedent allowed stepparent
support only if there had been “an unequivocal representation of
intent to support the child.”385 Today, explicit de facto parentage laws
go far beyond these cases in recognizing stepparents are on equal
footing with other legal parents in childcare settings. These laws

382. See, e.g., Klipstein v. Zalewski, 553 A.2d 1384, 1387–88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1988) (stating that in the absence of equitable estoppel, a stepparent has no duty to
support a stepchild).
383. See Weinand v. Weinand, 616 N.W.2d 1, 7–8 (Neb. 2000) (deeming the exhusband a stepfather because he had no biological ties).
384. Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 359 (N.J. 1984) (finding possible support from
former stepfather of children born to his ex-wife during an earlier marriage).
385. Ulrich v. Cornell, 484 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Wis. 1992) (requiring reliance on the
representation by the legal parent and resulting detriment to that parent).
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should prompt broader possible child support duties for stepparents
meeting imprecise childcare parentage norms.
As to a husband whose marital parentage presumption had been
rebutted, one precedent held there could never be post-divorce child
support for this now stepfather “[i]n the absence of a formal adoption.”386
Another recognized possible support, but only if there had been “an
unequivocal representation of intent to support the child;
. . . reliance . . . by the natural parent . . . [;] and detriment to the natural
parent or child.”387 Again, today, de facto parentage laws are extended to
many more husbands whose wives gave birth during marriage.
Earlier precedents narrowly recognizing possible child support for
ex-stepparents, including ex-husbands, must be reexamined.
Reexamination is needed where those same one-time parents fall
within de facto (and comparable) childcare parentage laws. Where
childcare is sought, as well as where childcare is possible but not
pursued, some possible child support duties by ex-stepparents to
natural or adoptive parents seem appropriate. De facto childcare
parent status, once achieved, is typically said to stand on equal footing
with natural or formal adoptive parent status. However child support
guidelines should not be comparable for all child support parents.
The older equitable estoppel cases teach that de facto parent child
support today might be limited to the support that was expressly (and
sometimes implicitly) promised.
By comparison, at least in the absence of promised future child
support, older equitable estoppel cases do not recognize even narrow
realms of grandparent support duties for grandchildren. The
emerging third-party (or nonparent) childcare laws do not open the
door widely to such child support duties, at least where there are no
grandparent childcare orders over parental objections and no earlier
grandparent promises as to future grandchild support.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the rights of birth, marital, biological, and adoptive
parents involving the care, custody, and control of their children, childcare
interests are increasingly recognized in the United States for de facto
parents as well as for nonparents, including grandparents and stepparents.
These enhanced childcare interests have not yet prompted serious
386. Price v. Price, No. W2012-01501-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 1701814, at *3 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2013).
387. A.M.N. v. A.J.N., 414 N.W.2d 68, 71 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
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considerations of new child support duties. It is time to explore such duties
with a view to expanding child support obligors in order to serve the best
interests of children. It is also time to explore how child support duties
should be recognized for those who agree, expressly or implicitly, to
provide future child support, even, at times, where they never undertake,
or discontinue, childcare for the children they promised to support.

